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This thesis studies police reform in El Salvador and South Africa.  While both 
countries differ considerably in geographic size, culture, location, population, and 
economic and military strength, they share common security concerns.  Under 
authoritarian rule, their primary security concerns were not military threats from other 
states, but rather internal threats due to economic, political, and social weakness.  
Civilian police forces became highly politicized and militarized, incapable of controlling 
crime, lacking accountability and oversight, and exhibiting total disregard for human 
rights.    
This thesis compares El Salvador and South Africa, two cases of negotiatedwar 
transitions.  Although both countries faced similar militarization of internal security 
forces, South Africa seemed in a much better position to face challenges of consolidation.  
First, South Africa’s military did not pose any opposition to police reform because the 
military and police had a long history of being organizationally separated.  In contrast, El 
Salvador’s police had a history of being controlled and directed by the mili ary and they 
fell organizationally under the Defense Ministry.  Second, in South Africa, the opposition 
group (ANC) rather than the rightist government won the foundational elections.  
Increased domestic support for internal security reform is more likely when the previous 
rightist government is discredited.  Conversely, in El Salvador, the rightist ARENA 
government won the foundational elections indicating that it would more likely lead to 
lack of domestic support.  The continuance of power would likely mean that the 
government would prefer the continuance of status quo to far-reaching reform.   
Finally, the international community was available to aid in the implementation 
and consolidation of reform in both countries.  However, because domestic support was 
likely to be greater in South Africa, the international community’s ability to influence the 
implementation of reform would also be greater.  Yet, the outcome of reform efforts in 
both countries was surprisingly similar.  This can best be explained by the overwhelming 
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I. THEORIZING ABOUT POLICE REFORM   
Since the end of the Cold War, an unprecedented number of countries have 
pursued democracy.  The legacy of past repression and human rights abuses against the 
civilian populations has necessarily focused concern on reforming their internal security 
apparatuses.  A central challenge to consolidation of democracy is police reform.  Despite 
the importance of police reform, cntemporary theories concerning transitions from 
authoritarian rule seldom directly address it as part of the democratization of state 
institutions.  Even the most recent studies of “third wave” democratic transitions have 
largely ignored the developing states’ police forces in the reconstitution of sta e power.1  
However, policing and public security are fundamental to the quality and stability of 
newly democratic regimes, especially in the areas of human rights, justice, and civil-
military relations.  While some scholars have included comments on the general role of 
police in discussions of military politics and civil-military relations, they fail to address 
how the police should be reorganized, retrained, and managed in order to best serve their 
communities.2  In most of the recent studie of democratization, the word “police” does 
not even appear in the indices.3  
Nevertheless, police reform is perhaps the most significant dimension of 
democratic transition.  There are three main reasons for this assertion.  First, police forces 
are by far the most visible institution of the democratic state, enforcing the rule of law 
                                         
1 Murray Scot Tanner, “Will the State Bring You Back In?  Policing and Democratization,” 
Comparative Politics, (October 2000):  101. 
2 One such example is in Alfred Stepan’s discussion of military prerogatives in chapter seven of his 
book, Rethinking Military Politics:  Brazil and the Southern Cone (New Jersey:  Princeton University 
Press, 1988), 93-127 (especially p. 96).  Stepan discusses the general role of the police for various levels of 
military prerogatives, but does not suggest any reform methods for the police in transitions to democracy. 
3 Recent studies include:  Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, D mocracy in 
Developing Countries:  Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Sec nd Edition, (Boulder:  Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999); Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 
Second Edition (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:  Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe (Baltimore:  The John Hopkins University Press, 1996); Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo 
O’Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, Issues in Democratic Consolidation:  The New South American 
Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1992); Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Third Wave:  Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK:  University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Guillermo O’Donnell, and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule, Volumes I and II, (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
2 
and protecting the rights of its citizens.  Although usually seen as protectors of justice and 
order, police forces have also inflicted tremendous human suffering throughout the 
modern era.  In the twentieth century, more citizens have died at the hands of their own 
government military and police forces than have died in battle during all the world’s 
international and civil wars combined.4  Where brutal security forces have been persistent 
in murdering and torturing their populations, transformation of these institutions is 
essential to ensure the safety of the citizens.       
Second, police forces are essential to democratic governance and to the 
relationship of state and society.  The meaning behind this is captured in David Bayley’s 
statement, “The police are to the government as the edge is to the knife.”5  P lice are 
expected to keep order in society.  How well they carry out their duty shapes society’s 
view of the state and of democracy.  Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin 
Lipset suggest the importance of the role of internal order in democratization efforts:  
“Democratic legitimacy…is shaped (particularly in the early years of a democracy) by 
the performance of the democratic regime, both economically and politically (through the 
‘maintenance of civil order, personal security, adjudication and arbitration of 
argument’…).  Historically, the more successful a regime has been in providing what 
people want, the greate and more deeply rooted its legitimacy has tended to be…”6  
Third, police forces are an important element of civil-military relations as they are 
authorized by the state as an institution of armed coercion.  In El Salvador and South 
Africa, as in many other countries with authoritarian pasts, the military and the police 
have played dominant roles in politics.  Thus, the establishment of civilian control over 
the military is vital to the consolidation of democracy.  The influence of the military on 
the police, especially in authoritarian regimes that have experienced internal conflict, has 
made the police forces part of that process.7   
                                         
4 Rudolph J. Rummel estimates the death toll from governmental mass murder of civilians at 
169,202,000 – more than four times the battle toll from for this century’s wars up to 1987.  Rudolph J. 
Rummel, “Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder,” Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 1 (February 1994):  2 
5 Paul Chevigny, Edge of the Knife:  Police Violence in the Americas (N w York:  The New York 
Press, 1995), Preface. 
6 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 10. 
7 Civil-military relations in transitions to democracy are discussed in several contemporary works.  
See, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (B ltimore:  The Johns 
3 
The police as an institution of democratic consolidation is also referred to 
obliquely in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s five key arenas necessary for successful 
transition and consolidation.  The five arenas are the development of a free and lively 
civil society, the existence of a relatively autonomous and valued political society, the 
establishment of a rule of law to legally guarantee citizens’ freedoms, the existence of a 
usable state bureaucracy, and an institutionalized economic society.8  While th  role of 
the police is of critical importance in all five of Linz and Stepan’s arenas, it is especially 
crucial for democratic consolidation in two of the arenas:  rule of law and state apparatus.  
The legacy of authoritarian rule has a tendency to institutionalize the police forces as the 
cornerstone of enforcing repressive laws.  Likewise, in establishing the rule of law in 
post-authoritarian societies, the police forces are equally vital to protect citizens’ rights 
and uphold the law.  Consolidated democracies also need an “effective capacity to 
command, regulate, and extract” through a functioning state bureaucracy that is usable by 
the new democratic government.  The police play a critical role in the state’s ability to 
“protect the rights of its citizens, …and to exercise effectively its claim to the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of force in the territory.”9 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MAIN ARGUMENT 
This thesis researches the process of reforming internal security forces in 
countries transitioning to democracy.  What challenges do countries transitioni g from 
authoritarian rule face as they attempt to create an internal security force that is 
compatible with democracy?  This primary question is addressed by examining the 
internal security reform processes during the transitions to democracy in El Salvador and 
South Africa.  Three secondary questions follow from the primary question.  What are the 
characteristics of internal security forces under authoritarian regimes?  What are the kinds 
of reform necessary to create internal security forces that are capable, subordinate to 
civilian authority, and respectful of human rights?  What are the roles of domestic and 
                                         
Hopkins University Press, 1996); Felipe Aguero, “The Military and the Limits to Democratization in South 
America,” in Mainwaring, O’Donnell, and Valenzuela, Issues in Democratic Consolidation; nd Stepan, 
Rethinking Military Politics. 
8 Linz and Stepan, 7-15. 
9 Linz and Stepan, 11. 
4 
international actors in carrying out these reforms and how do they contribute to their 
successful formulation and implementation?  
The main argument of this thesis has four parts and answers the research 
questions outlined in the preceding paragraph.  First, authoritarian states that 
experience internal conflict or civil war develop internal security forces that are 
highly militarized.  Three main characteristics illustrate this militarization: (1) the 
institutional boundaries between the military and the police are blurred and 
indistinct; (2) civilian police forces become deprofessionalized and incapable of 
carrying out basic policing duties; and (3) internal security forces lack meaningful 
mechanisms of accountability to oversee their actions.  Second, this thesis argues 
that negotiated war transitions afford key opportunities to reform corrupt and 
repressive internal security apparatuses.  However, the degree and nature of 
internal security reforms depends on the interests and balance of power of key 
actors affected by the reform.  Third, the challenges that affect the consolidation of 
internal security reform in war transitioning countries are related to post-conflict 
conditions.  Fourth, this research argues that negotiated war transitions provide an 
opening for international actors to affect major police reforms.  Although 
international actors are more likely to have the opportunity to affect police reform 
during negotiations of peace treaties, their actual level of influence depends on the 
level of domestic support and the ability of international actors to sustain 
commitment to those reforms over time.10 
This chapter explains the elements of the main argument by first, analyzing the 
militarization of internal security forces under authoritarian rule.  Second, this chapter 
discusses the imperative for police reform during democratic transition, and establishes 
the criteria for police reform in transitions to democracy.  Third, this chapter discusses 
the factors that affect the implementation of internal security reform, further explaining 
the war transitions argument and the challenges to consolidation of reform.  Additionally, 
this chapter also describes the international community’s role in influencing the nature of 
                                         
10 Charles T. Call uses the war transitions argument and the term “windows of opportunity” to 
describe the opening afforded by war transitions.  Charles T. Call, “From Soldiers to Cops:  War 
Transitions and the Demilitarization of Policing in Latin America and the Caribbean” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford 
University, 1999), 6. 
5 
internal security forces before, during, and after regime transition, as well as, police 
reform implementation and consolidation.  The findings of this research have 
implications for application in consolidation of democracy and future democratizing 
nations.      
B. NATURE OF INTERNA L SECURITY STRUCTURE S UNDER 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIME S 
In order to understand the nature of internal security structures under authoritarian 
regimes, it is useful to define what is meant by “authoritarian.”  Juan Linz defines 
authoritari n regimes as, “political systems with limited, not responsible, political 
pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, 
without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their 
development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within 
formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.”11  This definition calls 
attention to the fact that in authoritarian regimes, there is limited room for political 
participation and, especially, for political opposition to the leader or leading party.  The 
security forces, thus, become the enforcing agency of laws intended to control and limit 
the political expression of excluded portions of the population.   
As oppositional groups rise up against exclusionary practices and seek to have 
their voices heard, internal security forces become more repressive and militarized in 
their goal to keep the “unrest” at bay.  This militarization of the police is accentuated in 
cases where internal conflict or civil war ensues.  In these cases, internal security forces 
are compelled to use military tactics and weapons to ensure the “survival” of the regime.  
In many regimes, moving the police forces to the Ministry of Defense and subordinati g
them to military control emphasized police militarization.   
The common thread in the cases of El Salvador and South Africa emphasized by 
the internal conflicts in each country was the militarization of their internal security 
forces exhibited through three prominent characteristics.  The three most important 
characteristics of militarization are the blurring of institutional boundaries in internal 
                                         
11 Juan J. Linz, “An Authoritarian Regime:  The Case of Spain,” in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, 
(Editors), Mass Politics:  Studies in Political Sociology (New York:  Free Press, 1970),  255, cited in Linz 
and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 38. 
6 
security forces, the lack of professionalism of the civilian police, and the absence of 
mechanisms of accountability.   
1. Lack of Institutional Boundaries in Internal Security Forces
The degree to which institutional boundaries are lacking has varied among the 
different types of authoritarian regimes.  In military regimes, civilian control is 
nonexistent and in most cases, the military controlled the police.  Military leaders and 
organizations often performed a wide variety of functions, including extensive internal 
security and civil action roles only distantly related to traditional military missions.  In 
personal dictatorships, the ruler did whatever was necessary to ensure that his agents 
controlled the military and that the military served his purpose of keeping a tight grip on 
power.  In single-party regimes, the military was used as an instrument of he party.  The 
ultimate loyalty was to the party rather than to the state, as military officers often were 
required to be party members. 
A commonality gleaned through examination of institutional boundaries and civil-
military relations within these different authoritarian regime types is the blurring of 
external and internal threats to national security.  This was especially true in many 
authoritarian nations during the Cold War era, as leftists speaking out against the 
government were labeled “communist” and a threat to the survival of the regime.  Even in 
communist states, domestic unrest was often seen as externally or “foreign inspired.”12  
Groups of citizens were seen as enemies of the state, which justified the use of the 
military in internal lawenforcement.  Many internal security structures were reorganized 
with the civilian police forces under the Ministry of Defense furthering the militarization 
of internal security forces.  On the other hand, even in countries, such as South Africa, 
where police forces remained separate from the military, the hierarchical structure within 
the police forces were military in nature, even including military officers in top level 
positions.   
In some authoritarian regimes, such as El Salvador, separate educational 
institutions did not exist for the military and the police.  The police regularly trained with 
the military at military academies and were required to attend military courses in 
                                         
12 Jeanne K. Giraldo, “Democratizing Civil-Military Relations:  What Do Countries Legislate?”  
Occasional Paper #7 (Monterey, CA:  The Center for Civil-Military Relations, June 2001), 19. 
7 
counterinsurgency methods.  As a result, police and military tactics merged and excessiv  
use of force to control the population became commonplace.  Criminals were treated as 
military enemies of the state and the line between military and police doctrine were 
blurred.  This blurring of institutional boundaries between the military and police led to 
widespread human rights violations and increased politicization. 
The international community further aided the disintegration of institutional 
boundaries between the military and police.  During the Cold War, the United States and 
its Western allies sided with authoritarian rightist governments, giving the necessary 
financial and military aid for counterinsurgency operations.  At the same time, the Soviet 
Union and other communist block nations gave military aid to the leftist insurgency 
groups, thus, justifying in the eyes of some the blurring of institutional boundaries.  The 
Cold War superpowers helped pit authoritarian governments against their citizens in an 
ideological war, escalating the levels of violence and counterviolence.   
2.  Deprofessionalization of Civilian Police 
The militarization of police forces under authoritarian regimes and the consequent 
focus on political repression and use of force renders the police ill equipped for their 
“traditional” roles of crime detection and prevention.  In many cases, the legacy of 
authoritarian rule has left the police forces unable to perform even the most basic tasks 
including crime investigation, the gathering of evidence, and arrest procedures.  
Additionally, these police forces lose legitimacy with the citizens, thus cannot rely on 
them for intelligence, as the police do in any democratic society.  
Police training in many authoritarian regimes tends to be focused on 
counterinsurgency methods, guerrilla tactics, and use of overwhelming force rather than 
the controlled application of force necessary for police work.  Police recruits are required 
to attend military academies, where they are trained in the use of military weapons.  
There also tends to be an emphasis on “coercive techniques” to obtain confessions from 
would-be insurgents.  Over years of repression, the resultant police forces become 
completely inept at suppressing common crime, investigating criminal cases, and are 
unaware of the legal procedures necessary to protect citizen’s rights.  
 
8 
3. Absence of Mechanisms of Accountability 
Authoritarian regimes have a tendency to legitimize the actions of their police 
forces by adopting “laws” that define governmental opposition as criminal in nature and 
dangerous to “national security.”  In many authoritarian regimes, even peaceful 
demonstrations were seen as subversive and dangerous to its survival.  In South Africa, 
for example, a plethora of laws throughout the years of apartheid specifically delineated 
what actions were seen as a “thre t” to the national security of the regime.  As a result, 
the police forces were given the lawful authority to act on behalf of the state to uphold 
discriminatory laws that helped the survival of the regime.  Given the legislative nature of 
apartheid, the police force was a visible element of the system of oppression.  
Adding to this problem is the lack of redress methods against authoritarian police 
forces.13  Quite often, criminal charges against the police were internally handled with no 
accountability o an external independent organization, and not surprisingly, intimidation 
was used against those who came forward with allegations.  Other legal devices 
hampered potential complainants.  In addition, victims (especially in rural areas) did not 
have adequate knowledge of their legal rights and lacked access to qualified lawyers.  In 
most cases, authoritarian legal procedures placed the onus on the person to prove his/her 
allegations against the police, and even then, the veracity of police accounts was rarely 
challenged in inquiries. 
The state-police relationship in many authoritarian regimes was defined by a type 
of security mentality, in which every aspect of policing and police work was deemed to 
be of national security importance and as such, a state secret.14  This mentality provided 
that even in cases where there was some notional civilian accountability authority, 
through a Commissioner of Police or Minister of Law and Order, questions about 
policing were regularly deflected and never in practice called to account.  This important 
                                         
13 Overall, accountability does not exist in authoritarian regimes.  Therefore, if the central institutions, 
such as the Chief Executive, are not accountable, then the same is expected of other institutions, such as the 
military and the police. 
14 The issue of accountability, national security, and what is considered “secret” are problems tha  are 
not limited to authoritarian regimes.  This issue is also debated and scrutinized in established Western 
democracies.  For a contemporary example, see K.D. Ewing and C.A. Gearty, Freedom Under Thatcher:  
Civil Liberties in Modern Britain (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1990).   
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element of some democratic policing methods, police accountability to the local 
communities they serve, was completely absent in authoritarian regimes.15    
In many authoritarian regimes during the Cold War, ideology played a role in 
legitimating the discriminatory actions of the government.  Attacks on the population and 
obvious cases of brutality were often overlooked in the name of preventing the spread of 
communism.  Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, the “domino theory” was 
prominent in U.S. foreign policy, allowing rightist governments to do “whatever it takes” 
to keep communism in check.16 
C. DEMOCRATIC TRANSI TION AND THE NEED FOR POLICE REFORM  
 “Police reform” is an overused and underdefined term in U.S. and British social 
science.  Although many contemporary works use the term, few define it.  Police reform 
in one situation may refer to completely different kinds of changes, depending on the 
context.  For example, in post-communist Eastern Europe, police reform may refer to 
depoliticization or the removal of communist party influence on the police.  The term has 
also been applied to decentralization of the police in post-war Germany; increased 
responsiveness to ethnic concerns in the Los Angeles riots and the Brixton disorders in 
Great Britain; better oversight systems as in the New York City police reforms of the 
1990s; and increased effectiveness in crime-fighting as delineated in much of the U.S. 
literature on police reform in the twentieth century.17  Studies of police reform (and 
police reform itself) have focused on the most salient aspects of the problem, based on 
the crisis or event “triggering” the reform.   
                                         
15 One case study, which outlines the problems of political accountability, is the South African Police 
(SAP) during apartheid.  See Mike Brogden and Clifford Shearing, Policing For a New South Africa 
(London:  Routledge, 1993), 26-40. 
16 This was especially true in US foreign policy initiatives with El Salvador.  After the Sandinista 
victory in July 1979, US foreign policy placed El Salvador on its agenda as the other Central American 
state facing imminent collapse.  See Michael McClintock, The American Connection, Volume one:  State 
Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador (Lon n:  Zed Books, 1985), Chapter 13. 
17 Examples of this include:  Lou Cannon, Official Negligence:  How Rodney King and the Riots 
Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD (New York:  Time Books, 1997); Pamela K. Lattimore, James 
Trudeau, K. Jack Riley, Jordan Leiter, and Steven Edwards, Homici e in Eight U.S. Cities:  Trends, 
Context, and Policy Implications (Wa hington DC:  Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 
1997); Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring, and June Kim, “Declining Homicide in New York City:  A Tale 
of Two Trends,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, (June 1999); Eli B. Silverman, 
"Revolutionizing the Police:  Fighting Crime in New York City,”  Security Journal 9, (April 1997):  101-
104;  Judith Greene, “Zero Tolerance:  A Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City,” 
Crime and Delinquency 45, no. 2, (April 1999):  171-187.  
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The discussion of police reform in this thesis focuses on the demilitarization of 
internal security forces following war transitions to democracy.  The internal conflicts of 
El Salvador and South Africa were the reform “triggering” events, which focused 
attention on the militarized nature of the police forces.  Therefore, this thesis focuses on 
the three dimensio  of demilitarization in the reform of internal security forces:  the 
establishment of institutional boundaries between the military and civilian police forces, 
the professionalization of civilian police forces, and the establishment of meaningful 
mechanisms of accountability.  These dimensions are chosen as a counter against the 
three most prominent characteristics of police militarization under authoritarian rule.  
They are also chosen for their importance in establishing civilianized police forces that 
are compatible with democracy.18   
1. Establishment of Institutional Boundaries 
Establishment of institutional boundaries between the military and the police 
necessarily entails the adoption of civilian control over the military and police forces and 
a redefinition of the roles and missions of each.  In many cases of major police reform 
efforts, such as in El Salvador, the military was barred from participating in internal 
security roles by stipulation in the new constitution.  The Defense Ministry was 
reorganized and headed by a civilian Defense Minister, although a high-ranking retired 
military officer was appointed.  Additionally, the police were separated from the Defense 
Ministry into the Ministry of the Interior.  In other cases, such as South Africa, where the 
military and police were already under separate Ministries, establishing institutional 
boundaries meant the naming of civilians to head those Ministries and the removal of 
active duty officers from those and other political posts. 
Establishing institutional boundaries must also involve the removal of active duty 
military personnel from the police forces.  In some authoritarian regimes, such as South 
Africa, active duty personnel regularly transferred to the police forces and vice versa.  
Under democratic rule, this poses problems as the training of military and police differ in 
                                         
18 However, even in democracies, these charact ristics have been found to be lacking.  For example, 
the Brixton Disorders in the United Kingdom highlighted the need for better police training.  The Los 
Angeles riots emphasized the lack of accountability and problems in leadership.  These three 
characteristics, however, are the most salient in transitions to democracy coinciding with the end of internal 
conflict, where human rights violations need to be addressed and civil-military relations need to be 
improved.  
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tactics and use of force.  Separation of personnel and training ensures civilianization of 
police forces, thus making human rights abuses less likely.  
Finally, establishing inst tutional boundaries includes the reorganization of 
authoritarian hierarchical security structures, and a fundamental change in the tactics and 
methods used in basic policing.  In many authoritarian regimes, the police held military 
rank, reported to military supervisors, and used military equipment, transportation, and 
weaponry to police the population.  Authoritarian doctrine often entailed the use of force 
as a first resort, similar to military doctrine.  Democratic policing should include 
demilitarization of police organizational structures and a “hierarchical inversion” of 
policing methods.  The new methods should empower the police to act on criminal 
activity, while providing accountability for their actions.19  
2. Professionalization of Civilian Police 
The importance of professionalizing the new police forces is paramount to 
making fundamental changes in the nature and culture of policing.  This is especially true 
in transitions from authoritarianism; however, it is also an issue in established 
democracies.  The numerous volumes of literature on effective policing practices and 
studies on the blunders of policing problems point to the revamping of police training 
curriculums to improve professional qualities.20  Militarization of civilian police forces 
during the internal conflicts of authoritarian regimes led to policing trends stressing 
military doctrine, training, and methods.  This militarization further emphasizes the 
importance of reversing these trends and providing training in proper investigative, a rest, 
patrolling, and reporting procedures.  
In addition to new training programs, research has also concluded that recruiting 
methods should be redesigned to ensure that the composition of the police forces reflect 
the communities in which they serve.  This is crucial where authoritarian regimes have 
                                         
19 Dominique Wisler and Hanspeter Kriesi, “Public Order, Protest Cycles, and Poltical Process:  Two 
Swiss Cities Compared,” in Donatella Della Porta and Herbert Reiter (Editors), Policing Protest:  The 
Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press,
1998), 92. 
20 See Janet B.L. Chan, Changing Police Culture:  Policing in a Multi cultural Society (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1997), Chapter six and ten; Jean-Paul Brodeur, Comparisons in Policing:  An 
International Perspective (Aldershot:  Avebury, 1995), chapter two, three and eight; and Tor Tanke Holm 
and Espen Barth Eide (Editors), Peacebuilding and Police Reform (London:  Frank Cass, 2000). 
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discriminated against large ethnic or racial groups.  The new police forces need to adopt 
recruiting methods that encourage better ethnic and racial composition.21 
3. Establishment of Mechanisms of Accountability 
Why should there be civilian oversight and meaningful mechanisms of 
accountability of internal police forces?  The answer is two-fold.  First, the police should 
not be left to operate on their own as they have a history of human rights abuses and 
political interferences.  There should be an independent office to check that they do not 
repeat the horrible patterns, practices and mistakes committed under the past authoritarian 
regime.   
Second, by virtue of the very nature of their work, police are more vuln rable to 
abuse of human rights and as such should be monitored.  The fact that they “have a 
legitimate right to use force, if necessary” warrants close scrutiny of their activities.  The 
need for oversight is premised on the fact that the police are given powers that impact on 
the rights of citizens, and this in and of itself necessitates high levels of civilian oversight.  
This is especially true where police previously operated in a military environment where 
they were not held accountable.  
The issue of both external and internal controls on the police has been addressed 
in few police reform efforts.  The relative exception of such cases reflects the lack of 
detail in most post-conflict agreements with respect to public security.  Internal controls 
are accountability mechanisms within the military and police institutions, such as 
Inspector General offices and other internal offices that monitor the performance and 
behavior of personnel.  Cases of abuses and infractions are investigated in-hou e, as 
opposed to using an outside agency.  The advantage is that disciplinary action can be 
implemented quickly and changes to training and doctrine are more readily accepted from 
within the organization.  
Where internal controls are weak, external controls can pick up some of the slack.  
The media and human rights ombudsmen office are examples of external control 
mechanisms.  These offices from outside the organization often instigate investigations of 
                                         
21 Chan’s book covers the many strategies for changing discriminatory culture in police forces.  See 
especially chapter three. 
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abuse and corruption.  International actors can also play a strong genda-setting role and 
develop greater capacity to assist in the development of effective oversight and 
accountability mechanisms.  This can be key in helping weak transitioning states use 
internationally provided resources in a manner that reduces waste, corruption, and 
criminality.    
D. FACTORS AFFECTING  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICE 
REFORM   
Recent studies have concluded that while regime transitions may facilitate police 
reforms, they are not sufficient.  Policing is “a barometer of state-society rel ions,” and 
the security apparatus is at the core of the state.  Its embeddedness in the state means that 
regime changes often leave the security apparatus intact.  Where regime transition from 
authoritarianism occurs in conjunction with transition f om armed conflict, termed “war 
transition,” as in Guatemala (1996) and Haiti (1994), major civilianizing police reforms 
occur.  Conversely, where democratization unfolds without the termination of conflict, 
such as in Ecuador (1984) and Brazil (1985), major police reforms rarely materialize.22   
The argument further states that major police reforms do not occur in all cases of 
war transition.  The way a conflict ends indicates whether police reform occurs.  It has 
been found that police reform only occurs where states have lost armed conflict or 
negotiated an end to such conflicts.  In cases where government forces have been 
victorious, military prerogatives remain high and inhibit the development of police 
reform measures.23 
First, where regime transition occurs as a result of governmental defeat in civil 
war, the resultant police reform efforts reflect the interests of the victorious oppositional 
groups.  Second, in transitions where an external army defeats and occupies a country, 
the nature and composition of the police forces reflects the bargaining between the 
external power and the newly installed government.  The third type of war transition 
occurs where conflict ends in a negotiated settlement.  This type of war transition 
corresponds to the transitio s in El Salvador and South Africa.  In these cases, the nature 
                                         
22 This argument and a detailed explanation of “war transition” is presented in Charles T. Call’s Ph.D. 
diss., Chapter one, especially 47-48.   
23 Call, 49.  
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of the post-conflict reflects the balance between the opposing parties.24  Recent literature 
about negotiated transitions, however, do not discuss the different types of negotiation in 
these war transitions.  Hence, this thesis researches two specific and very different cases 
of negotiated war transitions to determine the effect of the differences on the reforms 
implemented.  
1. Roles and Influence of Domestic Actors  
This thesis argues that succe sful police reform demands the support or 
acquiescence of a number of domestic actors, namely the military, the police, and the 
political leadership.  There are two major assertions that highlight the roles and influence 
of these actors.  First, the legacy of the authoritarian relationship between the police and 
the military affects the level of military opposition to police reform efforts.  When 
military forces have had a history of commanding and directing the police, such as in El 
Salvador, demilitar zing reforms will likely meet with military resistance.  Military forces 
accustomed to power generally resist the loss of internal security powers and 
commanding powers over police.  Losing control of internal security functions often 
entails decreased lve s of funding, another unpopular byproduct of demilitarizing 
reforms.  On the other hand, in cases where the police and the military have been 
organizationally separate, as in South Africa, military resistance is likely to be less 
because the military does not feel that it is losing a major portion of its organization.  
Second, the degree and nature of internal security reforms will depend on the 
interests and balance of power of the key actors affected by the reform.  In El Salvador, 
where the ARENA government was not discredited, the government and military enjoyed 
the support of the majority of the population.  The FMLN, being at a disadvantage, felt 
that the negotiations period with the United Nations providing mediation was the only 
time where they would have their demands met.  The FMLN pushed for a “shock 
treatment” change to the internal security forces in exchange for their demobilization and 
the details were stipulated in the peace accords.  Although the FMLN “won” the accords 
because of the involvement of the UN, they “lost” the implementation because of the 
reluctance of the rightist government closely allied with the military to see the accords 
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Chapter One. 
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through.  In South Africa, by contrast, the National Party government was discredited.  
The black oppositional groups enjoyed the majority of support from the population.  
South Africa’s police reform reflected the confident gradualism of the ANC, as police 
reform remained on the agenda in the years following the transition. 
2. Challenges to Consolidation of Reform 
The challenges that war transitioning countries face when reforming their internal 
security apparatuses are related to the post-conflict conditions in their societies.  Post-
conflict societies share characteristics that can block or inhibit reform consolidation, such 
as high levels of violence and crime.  Similar challenges of post-conflict societies 
contributed to similar outcomes in the two cases – middl  of the road reforms.  The 
demobilization of combatants and the influx of powerful weapons into society contribute 
to a transitional security vacuum, which has the effect of creating crime surges.  Related 
to the crime problem is the development of parallel police units that can undermine the 
legitimacy of the new police force and inhibit their development.  Another challenge is 
the timely development and deployment of oversight units to instill an expectation of 
accountability within the new police forces.  Finally, the challenge of implementing 
simultaneous judicial reform is a difficult issue.  The l gacies of past corrupt judicial 
practices in authoritarian regimes can undermine the successes of police reform and 
damage efforts at instilling trust among citizens. 
3. Role of International Actors in Police Reform 
This thesis also argues that nego iat d war transitions provide an opening for 
international actors to affect major police reforms.  Although international actors have the 
opportunity to affect the extent of police reform called for in peace treaties, the actual 
implementation of reform is limited by the level of domestic support for reform and the 
tendency of the international community not to sustain commitment to reform over time.  
If domestic support for reform is lacking, the international community will find it 
difficult to be an influencing factor on reform implementation.  If domestic support is 
strong, the international community can provide more influence on the implementation 
and consolidation of reform efforts.  The transitioning country will be more open to 
international ideas and reform suggestions.  In turn, the international actors will be more 
confident that their efforts will not be wasted.  The additional challenge that international 
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actors face is the difficulty of sustaining their commitment to implementation and 
consolidation over time.  Numerous scholars have documented the long arduous road to 
internal security reform faced by post-conflic  societies.25  In most cases, the amount of 
time needed is longer than was originally planned.  International actors will be hesitant 
about “wasting” their resources and contributing to reform measures that will not likely 
be consolidated.  International actors are challenged to provide continued assistance 
throughout the crucial phases until consolidation is achieved.   
E. CASE SELECTION 
This thesis studies two countries whose democratization efforts in the early 1990s 
included changes to their internal security apparatuses.  Comparing the very different 
regimes of El Salvador and South Africa allows identification of common developments 
in internal security apparatuses that can be attributed to authoritarian rule.  While both 
countries differ considerably in geographic size, culture, location, population, and 
economic and military strength, they share common security concerns.  Under 
authoritarian rule, their primary security concerns were not military threats from other 
states, but rather internal threats due to economic, political, and social weakness.  
Moreover, Salvadoran and South African authoritarian regimes both used the police and 
military, as additional constabulary, to suppress large portions of the civilian population.  
Civilian police forces became highly politicized and militarized, incapable of controlling 
crime, lacking accountability and oversight, and exhibiting total disre ard for human 
rights.    
This thesis compares El Salvador and South Africa, two cases of negotiated war 
transitions.  Although both countries faced similar militarization of internal security 
forces, South Africa seemed in a much better position to face challenges of consolidation.  
First, South Africa’s military did not pose any opposition to police reform because the 
military and police had a long history of being organizationally separated.  In contrast, El 
Salvador’s police had a history of being controlled and directed by the military and they 
fell organizationally under the Defense Ministry.  Second, in South Africa, the opposition 
group (ANC) rather than the rightist government won the foundational elections.  
                                         
25 Stanley and Loosle, Stanley and Call, Johnstone, McCormick, Malan, and Shaw, cited throughout 
this thesis have all addressed the issue of the long period of time needed to bring about reform. 
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Increased domestic support for internal security reform is more likely as the previous 
rightist government is discredited.  Conversely, in El Salvador, the rightist ARENA 
government won the foundational elections indicating that it would more likely lead to 
lack of domestic support.  The continuance of power would likely mean that the 
government would prefer the continuance of status quo to far-reaching reform.   
Finally, the international community was available to aid in the implementation 
and consolidation of reform in both countries.  However, because domestic support was 
likely to be greater in South Africa, the international community’s ability to influence the 
implementation of reform would also be greater.  Yet, the outcome of reform efforts in 
both countries was surprisingly similar.  Th s can best be explained by the overwhelming 
obstacles to the consolidation of police reform posed by the conditions of post-conflict
societies.  
F. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis proceeds in the following fashion.  Chapter two analyzes the 
authoritarian regimes of El Salvador and South Africa and describes in detail the 
structure of their security apparatuses prior to regime transition.  The purpose is to 
emphasize how El Salvador and South Africa’s authoritarian past led to the militarization 
of their internal security forces.  Additionally, international actors reinforced this trend 
and Cold War ideology justified increased use of military forces and tactics to keep 
internal order. 
Chapter three discusses the transition to democracy and the nature of the internal 
security reforms carried out in each country.  The end of internal conflict and the 
negotiated nature of democratic transition allowed major police reform efforts to emerge 
in El Salvador and South Africa.  However, the legacy of authoritarian r le and the 
balance of power of actors during the negotiations and transition affected the shape and 
nature of the reform process.    
The fourth and final chapter outlines the challenges affecting the consolidation of 
reform efforts in each country and offers recommendations for future internal security 
reform efforts.  Challenges affecting the consolidation of internal security reform in war 
transitioning countries are related to the post-conflict conditions that exist within those 
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societies.   Post-conflict societies share features like high levels of violence and crime, 
which make internal security reforms both more urgent and more difficult to control.  
Lack of infrastructure to deal with these issues and the magnitude of reform measures 
needed also present challenges.  Chapter four also describes the roles and challenges of 
international actors in implementation and consolidation of reform measures.  The thesis 
concludes with recommendations for future internal scurity reform processes. 
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II.  THE LEGACY OF A UTHORITARIAN RULE  
The problems and challenges facing police reform in El Salvador and South 
Africa today have their origins in each country’s authoritarian past.  The purpose of this 
chapter is three-fold.  First, this chapter outlines the history of security policies in each 
country emphasizing the increased level of militarization that arose during authoritarian 
rule.  Militarization took the form of three main security dimensions or characteristics:  a 
blurring of the institutional boundaries between the military and the police, a decrease in 
the level of professionalism of the police and military forces, and a lack of meaningful 
accountability mechanisms concerning the conduct of civilian police forces.  The 
militarization of internal security structures unde  authoritarian rule put police reform on 
the agenda during transition to democracy. 
The second purpose is to highlight the impact of international actors and Cold 
War ideology on the militarization of internal security forces in the two countries.  
International actors reinforced the militarization of internal security forces in the internal 
conflicts of each country by siding with the rightist governments, providing them with 
military and financial support, and encouraging the police to adopt counterinsurgency 
strategy and methods.  Cold War ideology justified the increased use of military tactics, 
and weapons by the police to control each country’s internal conflict.  
Finally, this chapter highlights important differences between the two cases that 
would have significant implications for reform efforts.  Although the militarization of 
police forces occurred in both countries, the blurring of institutional boundaries between 
the police and the military was greater in El Salvador than in South Africa.  As a result, 
the military was less opposed to police reform in South Africa than in El Salvador.  In 
fact, police reform efforts began even prior to the transition to democracy in South 
Africa.   
A. EL SALVADOR’S MIL ITARY RULE  
El Salvador’s legacy of military rule dates back to the nineteenth century, the 
structure of which has passed through various phases since Central America gained their 
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independence in 1821.  Before the 1880’s internal security was managed by military 
forces loyal to the caudillos rather than by any organized state police force.  Between the 
1880’s and 1932, public security forces (police) emerged largely in response to socio-
economic changes created by Liberal reformers and to specific interests of economic 
elites.  However, it was during the sultanistic authoritarian26 egime of General 
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, from 1932 to 1944 that civilian police forces became 
more politically oriented than at any other time in the history of El Salvador.  The 
turbulent period from 1944- 8 saw police forces increasingly subordinated to the 
armed forces as steps were taken to insulate them from partisan use and influence.  By 
the end of the 1960’s, U.S. security assistance consolidated the militarized nature of 
Salvadoran military and police f r s, which continued throughout the quasi-civilian and 
counterinsurgent regimes of 1979-19 1.27   
In general, Salvadoran police and military forces have been highly militarized and 
politicized, reflecting the political regimes under which they existed.  Thr e overall 
militaristic characteristics developed, which account for the coercive and repressive 
structure of El Salvador’s security forces.  First, the institutional boundaries between the 
internal security forces were indistinct, as the armed forces increasingly exercised more 
control over internal security forces.  Second, as the police forces were subsumed under 
the military, the level of professionalism of the police went down.  Civilian police force 
doctrine became more concerned with military tact cs, maximum use of force, and 
counterinsurgency rather than with the more traditional police role of crime investigation 
and keeping domestic tranquility.  Third, as the institutional boundaries between the 
internal security forces became indistinct and police forces deprofessionalized, 
accountability and oversight mechanisms were nonexistent and, in fact, had never 
existed.  There was no process to keep either the political authorities or the internal 
security forces accountable to the citizens they were suppos d to serve.   
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Additionally, international actors and Cold War ideology influenced this 
militarization of internal security forces.  Hegemonic and ideological concerns helped 
shape the structure, nature, and doctrine of El Salvador’s coercive security apparatuses. 
1. The Origins of Internal Security Forces 
During the nineteenth century, as was the case in the rest of Central America, the 
force of arms was instrumental in achieving and holding public office.  Caudillos and 
their armies, organized around liberal and conservative ideologies, and battled for control 
of the government from independence in 1821 through the 1880s.  “Police legislation” 
and institutions in the early post-col nial period and throughout the remainder of the 
nineteenth century dealt primarily with the control of rural Indian labor.28  
The most important factor shaping the policing patterns during the nineteenth 
century was the interests of the ladino landowning elite.  In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, important shifts in the socio-economic structure greatly affected the 
state to society relationship and the subsequent structure of internal security forces.  
During the 1880s, legislation was introduced, which abolished the traditional collective 
ownership of land by Indian communities, ejidos and tierras communales.  El Salvador’s 
Indian peasants were dispossessed of their self-suff cient land and homes.  As a result, 
land became concentrated into the hands of the rising and increasingly powerful coffee 
aristocracy, while the Indian and mestizo populations were reduced to supplying the 
seasonal labor for the growing coffee plantations.  Strong resistance to these laws gave 
way to violent uprisings.  In some communities, judges were taken prisoner and 
maimed.29 
To enforce land transfers and contain resistance, the army was initially used.  
However, by the late 1880s a rural police, Policía Montada, or “Mounted Police,” was 
founded through national legislation and financed by a tax on coffee exports.  The rural 
police served to increase state vigilance aimed at preventing peasants from any means of 
subsistence except wage labor on plantations.  At the same time, the liberal reforms of the 
1880s called for a revamping of the San Salvador urban police force, renamed “Policía 
                                         
28 Philip J. Williams and Knut Walter, Militarization and Demilitarization:  In El Salvador’s Transition 
to Democracy (Pittsburgh, PA:  University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 13-14. 
29McClintock, 94. 
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Reformada.”  Other main coffee-growing cities were also establishing similar forces.  By 
1905, efforts were made to administratively link the urban forces of all the cities and 
form what was eventually known as the Policía Nacional.  This national public police 
force answered to the civilian elites.  Officially, the police forces responded to governors 
and mayors under the Ministry of Government.  However, the internal organization and 
rankings were military in nature, and during much of this period, the urban police of the 
capital city, San Salvador, responded to the War Ministry.30 
Under President Dr. Manuel Enrique Araujo, the most feared and respected 
security force was established in 1912, La Guardia Nacional, which was modeled 
roughly on the Spanish Civil Guard.  Araujo placed the National Guard under the 
Ministry of Government and Development, however, the organization, personnel, duties, 
discipline, and material were under the authority of the Ministry of War and Navy.  In 
1914, after Araujo’s assassination, the Ministry of War and Navy brought the Guard 
formally under the Army.  The Guard’s main duty had always been to enforce political 
control on the rural population through forcible displacement.  However, the emergence 
of efforts to organize trade unions in the early twentieth century presented a new 
challenge to the economic elite, and the Guard duties were expanded to prevent such 
organization.31 
Regional dynamics of the early twentieth century also played a role in the 
formation of security policy in El Salvador and reflected the hegemonic concerns of the 
United States.  The politics surrounding the construction of the Panama Canal in the 
1920s illustrate U.S. intolerance of political instability in the Caribbean and Central 
America.  This intolerance is revealed in the words of then U.S. Secretary of State Elihu 
Root, “The inevitable effect of our building the Canal must be to require us to police the 
surrounding premises.”32  Hegemonic influence reached beyond the countries directly 
occupied by the U.S. and in 1923, under intense pressure from the U.S., the five Central 
American republics signed the Central American Treaty of Peace and Amity.  This treaty 
committed each state to form internal security forces that were efficient, centralized, 
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military-trained, and equipped with sufficient power to deter civil wars and guarantee the 
stability of pro-U.S. regimes.33  
2. Politicization of Police Forces – 1932 to 1948 
The development of an elaborate security system in El Salvador, the explosive 
escalation of state terror, and the violent civil war that lasted twelve years (1979-1991) 
would be inexplicable without reference to the events that rocked the tiny nation in 1932.  
The year 1932 stands out for two major reasons.  First, the occurrence of la matanza, the 
most famous massacre in the country’s history, established a relationship of fear and 
repression between the rural population and the state.  Second, 1932 marks the 
emergence of a new political regime and a change in the nature of the state, both of which 
changed the public security system. 
a. La Matanza 
In 1931, after a number of presidential administrations (known as the 
Meléndez-Quiñonez period), President Arturo Araujo was elected on a populist reform 
platform.  His critics, however, accused Araujo of being a communist.  Additionally, he 
confronted a crisis in export earnings as a result of the Great Depression and increasing 
levels of labor organization.  Dissatisfaction grew and within ten months Araujo was 
replaced in a bloodless coup by his Vice Presid nt, General Maximiliano Hernández 
Martínez.  Prepared for the impending communist peasant revolt, Martínez postponed 
municipal elections twice, prompting strikes in the Western parts of the country, which 
grew into widespread violence on the night of January 22, 1932.34  Several thousand 
indigenous and mestizo peasants attacked towns, municipal offices, homes, and military 
barracks.  Armed mostly with machetes and a number of rifles, the insurgents took over 
several western towns, overwhelmed isolated police posts, and engaged in looting, arson, 
rape, and murder.  Overall, the rebels killed about one hundred people, including thirty-
five civilians and local police, five customs police, ten National Police, ten National 
Guardsmen, and between twenty and forty soldiers.35 
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The government response was swift and brutal.  National Guard and army 
forces descended upon the communist insurgents and systematically defeated them in just 
three days.  However, in the weeks that followed, the Martínez regime eliminated anyone 
in the western part of the country whom they suspected looked like an Indian, dressed 
like a peasant, or carried a machete.  Within a few weeks an estimated ten thousand 
peasants were massacred.  As a result, 1932 is generally considered as the year that El 
Salvador ceased to have an Indian population.  Indians were moved to discard their 
traditional native dress and outer signs of Indian identification, even ceasing to teach their 
children the native language.  Even though the massacre did not wholly exterminate the 
Indian people, virtually no Indian culture or identity remained.36
b. Police-Military Relationship 
In the aftermath of la matanza, Martínez gradually and increasingly relied 
upon the internal security forces for political support rather than the army.  Even before 
1932, the National Guard suggested to peasants how they should vote in elections.  
However, under Martínez, the Guard more openly promoted the interests of his party, the 
Pro-Patria party.  Martínez built up the personnel and the budget of the National Police 
and the National Guard.  He placed General Tomás Calderón, the armed forces top 
ranking general, as the Minister of Government and Agriculture, and so in command of 
internal security.  Resentment grew among military leaders because General Calderón’s 
rank gave internal security forces favor over military command.  Eventually, military 
resentment led to a coup attempt in April 1944, which was successfully thwarted by the 
National Police and Guard, who were loyal to Martínez.  However, continued military 
outrage and public criticism finally obliged Martínez to resign.37
By the end of the Martínez regime, most of the elements of the public 
security system were in place, which persisted until 1991.  The three principal security 
forces, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Treasury Police, in addition to 
the Customs Police and the Immigration Police, shared internal security responsibilities 
with the army.  What changed over the next four decades were the roles and missions f 
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these forces and their degree of militarization, which steadily increased through the 
1980s.38 
3. Military Rule - “Balance” Between Reform and Repression – 1948 to 
1979 
From 1948 to 1979, a number of military coups institutionalized the pattern of 
military authoritarian rule.  General Salvador Castaneda Castro in January 1945 won an 
election typical of those that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s where no oppositional 
parties had the opportunity to put forth candidates or compete.39  Castan da sought to 
reduce the power and politicization of the National Police, and shifted it from the 
Ministry of Government to a new Public Security Branch of the Ministry of War.  The 
following year, he switched the National Guard to the National Defense Branch of the 
War Ministry.  Castaneda’s goal was to place the security forces under the firm control of 
the military in order to undercut the possibility of playing the police against the army, as 
Martínez had done with such success.40  
The legacy of the military governments of 1948 to 1979 was the continued 
occupancy of top political posts by the armed forces.  The military initially sought to 
redeem their image, to end its involvement in politics, and to implement social reforms.41  
They claimed to be uniquely positioned to arbitrate between landed oligarchs and the vast 
poor majority of the population.  The military thought itself able to act on behalf of the 
national interest and not in the interests of any particular class.  In fact, however, military 
governments were toppled when either they used excessive force and brutality in 
repressing demonstrations, or when they failed to suppress them and elites feared 
impending social instability.  As a result, military presidents of the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s maintained an uncomfortable compromise between reform and repression, and 
engaged in what they considered a balancing act.42  
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4. Anti-Communism and U.S. Hegemonic Influence 
Following the revolutionary victory in Cuba in 1959, anti-commu ism became a 
more central feature of doctrine and operations in El Salvador and the rest of Latin 
America.  Whereas European models had predominantly shaped the organization of
Salvadoran security forces and their relationship to the state prior to 1960, after this time 
U.S. security models and assistance policies were more pronounced. 
Under President John F. Kennedy, the U.S. embarked on a hemispheric effort to 
bolster counterinsurgency capabilities of internal security forces as a component of the 
U.S. “containment” policy.  This entailed drawing military forces increasingly into 
internal intelligence gathering operations (a reversal of past U.S. military teachings), 
enhancing anti-terror and intelligence capabilities, relying on semi-autono ous 
paramilitary organizations, and orienting the police forces toward internal political 
control and repression of armed insurgents.  An essential element of counterinsurgency 
training was the concept of using guerrilla tactics against perceived communist political 
groups.  These tactics included secrecy, assassination, psychological operations, and 
attacks on opposition support populations.43  Thi  assistance was accompanied by 
extensive conomic development aid under the umbrella of the Alliance for Progress.  
During this period, communist political opposition became better organized and 
opposition groups developed and trained their own armed units.44  However, the 
counterinsurgent efforts a  exceeded the actual threat, a lingering shadow of la matanza. 
The 1960s and 1970s saw U.S. military assistance in the form of a continuous 
flow of temporary duty (TDY) military “advisors” and mobile training teams (MTTs).  
This assistance led to structural changes in the intelligence agencies of both the military 
and the police and stepped up military capabilities and cooperation.45  In 1961, the 
President, Colonel Julio A. Rivera chose General José A. Medrano to assemble a small 
intelligence unit consisting of only 15 elite army officers, the Servicio de Seguridad or 
Security Service, which reported directly to the President and the General Staff.  This 
group became the coordinating center of the intelligence system network, linking all the 
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political intelligence sections of El Salvador including those of the National Police and 
the National Guard.  The Security Service, later reorganized and renamed Agencia 
Nacional de Seguridad de El Salvador (ANSESAL), drew heavily on intelligence 
collected from the service agencies.  However, full- ange access was reserved only for 
the Security Service members and the President.46  
The Security Service’s main achievement under Medrano was the building of 
ORDEN (Organización Democrática Nacionalista), a n tion-wide paramilitary network 
of informants representing the most significant Salvadoran private policing effort of the 
twentieth century.47  ORDEN recruited mainly from the military reserves where skills 
and political indoctrination could be closely monitored.  Careful selection of recruits was 
accomplished in conjunction with army commanders and army officers commanding the 
National Guard units.48 
Although highly trained in military tactics, the police forces were not focused on 
or trained in the traditional work of preventing and resolving cases of common crime.  
Rather, all security training, which took place at the Military Academy, was military in 
nature and focused on military counterinsurgency tactics.  Classes were integrated with 
equal numbers of military and police students undergoing identical training.49  This 
resulted in increased militarization of police forces and a decrease in the ability of 
civilian police to investigate common crime and carry out normal policing duties.        
5. Cold War Legitimation and the International Community 
The 1970s saw the emergence of leftist guerrilla organizations, which struck 
important blows to the state, although never quite reaching the point of being able to 
topple it.  In response to the increase in opposition violence, Presid t Rom ro 
announced the Law of Defense and Guarantee of Public Order on 25 November 1977.  
This new measure provided the security forces with arbitrary arrest and detention powers 
against demonstrators, labor activists, and others suspected of “subversive speech.”  The 
law provided legal cover under which the security forces could be increasingly arbitrary.  
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Rather than focusing on the guerrilla organizations, the security forces arrested, detained, 
and disappeared an increasingly expansive group of labr, student, neighborhood, 
Church, and Christian Democratic activists, with seeming disregard as to whether they 
could be considered a bonafide threat to the state.  By 1978 killings by government 
security forces and death squads averaged 57 per month.50
U.S. further legitimized the actions of the Salvadoran security forces.  The mild 
reaction of Ambassador Frank Devine to the 1977 Public Order law illustrates this point.  
He announced to the American Chamber of Commerce, “Any government has the full 
right and obligation to use all legal means at its disposal to combat terrorism.”51  The 
majority of “subversive” activity, however, was in the form of demonstrations and 
strikes.  It is more than likely that President Romero read Devine’s statement as a sign 
that the U.S. would now tolerate repressive measures to quell governmental opposition.52  
During the course of the 1980s, the Salvadoran military and security forces, 
received over $600 million in U.S. military assistance.  The U.S. often failed to get the 
Salvadoran government and armed forces to go along with its wishes in 
counterinsurgency and (later) in its peace negotiations; however, FMLN leaders believe 
that the United States’ aid was decisive in averting guerrilla victory in the early 1980s, 
and in persuading the Christiani government to agree to peace later in 1991.  Thus, 
international actors directly affected the nature and outcome of the internal conflict in El 
Salvador.53 
B. SOUTH AFRICA’S COLONIAL RULE  
Since the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, the South African Police 
(SAP) had the primary task of policing race relations, like any other colonial police force.  
At first, the governmental approach towards the goal of racial domination was hit-or-
miss, or ad hoc.  However, by the 1940s, South Africa’s booming industries suffered 
from the casual approach to racial control in its British influenced paternalistic 
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“democracy.”  It became necessary for the insecure white minority population to 
systematically establish instruments of political and economic control over the black 
majority.  The white National Party (NP) politicians played up the threat of a militant 
black proletariat during their campaign in the late 1940s.  This set the stage for apartheid, 
gave rise to worldwide abhorrence, and eventually reduced South Africa to the status of a 
pariah.54   
The “Total Strategy” period from 1976 to 1992 is the most decisive era of 
apartheid, which explains the shaping of internal security forces in South Africa.  This is 
the period where internal security forces were the most brutal and opposition was at its 
peak.  The SAP’s role in subjugating the majority of the population led to an emphasis on 
militarism and deprofessionalization in normal policing methods and techniques within 
the force.  Moreover, the violence of South African policing was facilitated and enabled 
at all legal, organizational, and political levels.  This created a warped “accountability” 
system, which permitted rather than prevented violence and motivated police officers to 
do “whatever it takes” to sustain apartheid.  Furthermore, international actors, in Cold 
War competing tactics also helped sustain the conflict in South Africa.   
1. Politicization of the Security Forces – 1948-1959 
The 1948 victory of the National Party began South Africa’s infamous 
“apartheid” era.  Apartheid needs little introduction.  Its simple function was to limit 
black South Africans’ access to their country’s resources while at the same ensuring their 
labor was available to promote the interests of white South Afr cans.  Apartheid was the 
centerpiece of a society that thrived on the pervasive reality of race-b sed power, 
privilege, and social superiority.  It was an elaborate theoretical rationalization for the 
racial domination that had prevailed in South Africa virtually since the first European 
settlers arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652.  Racial policing existed well before 
apartheid; however, it was during apartheid that policing became especially brutal. 
Apartheid infiltrated into every conceivable sphere of South African society, 
including interpersonal relations, social and economic organization, residential patterns, 
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and the political organization of the state.  The decade of the 1950s was marked by the 
drafting of legislation designed to control the physical movement and social life of black 
South Africans including:  the Population Registration Act (1950), which classified 
individuals by race; the Group Areas Act (1950), which delineated racially zoned living 
areas; the Immorality Act (1951), which made marriage and sexual relations between 
races illegal; and the Bantu Education Act (1953), which defined African education in 
apartheid principles.55 
As enforcers of these discriminatory laws, the police were the key agents of state 
policy, as well as the most immediate symbol of black oppression.  Three features 
distinguished policing under the first phase of apartheid:  the extension of police powers, 
increasing brutality, and an accompanying withdrawal of legal and political constraint on 
police conduct.  A new Police Act was passed in 1958 giving the police responsibility for 
the “preservation of internal safety in the Union,” a power they always had in practice but 
had never been legally defined.  The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Act 
No 29 in 1955 gave the police the right to search and arrest without a warrant.  The SAP 
was also given extensive new powers by the Criminal Procedure Act No 56 of the same 
year, which allowed them to detain suspects for up to 180 days without court 
regulation.56  
Policing ordinary crime during this era was not a priority.  Crime was dealt with 
by focusing on political unrest and the administrative regulations, which defined the 
boundaries between races.  One of the leading criminologists, J. van Heerden, Chief of 
Bantu Affairs Commissioner in the 1950s, said that the source of crime lay in the social 
mixing in residential areas.  He believed that enforcing segregation would solve crime 
and the police could prevent crime by enforcing apartheid’s race laws.57  The po ice 
became objects of fear when enforcing race laws that did not deal with ordinary crime.  
Furthermore, policing apartheid in the 1950s did not initially demand sizable numbers of 
police or professional skills in dealing with the public.  Instead, what was important was 
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brute force, an organizational culture and managerial philosophy that encouraged this, 
and an arsenal of equipment, which made the police into a killing machine.   
2. Militarization and Deprofessionalization – 1960-1975 
In 1960, South Africa abandoned membership from the British Commonwealth 
because of criticism over apartheid policies.  South Africa voted to become a Republic.  
Also in 1960, following the debacle in Sharpeville, black political opposition became 
militarized, went underground, and went abroad.  This forced the police to focus on the 
external rather than the internal threat, to develop counter-insurgency skills, and to 
rapidly expand its manpower and resources.  This era was also marked by the 
development of the Bantustans, self-governing homelands, and the ensuing industrial 
decentralization and population removals.  This phase of apartheid affected policing in 
three ways.  Policing race relations was expanded to include intervening and enforcing 
the removal of Africans to new homelands.  Second, as control laws were tightened as 
part of Bantustanization, the police enforced the pass laws with renewed vigor, resulting 
in a further deterioration in their relation with urban Africans.  Finally, policing was 
decentralized to accommdate for the emergence of homeland police forces.58   
As the apartheid government strengthened, so did black resistance.  Freedom 
fighters continued their campaign against apartheid laws, despite continued repression.  
On 21 March 1960, in Sharpeville, a peaceful demonstration against pass laws ended 
when police opened fire on the crowd, killing 69 Africans and wounding more than 200.  
Sharpeville was followed by violent encounters between the police and protesters at 
Langa and elsewhere in the country.  The government declared a state of emergency on 
30 March 1960, deployed troops and police into black townships, exiled the African 
National congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) black resistance groups, 
and detained black political supporters by th  thousands.  One such detainee was Nelson 
Mandela, leader of the ANC, who continued his resistance efforts from his prison cell for 
the duration of his imprisonment.59  These events established a dynamic relationship 
between domestic confrontation resulting from lack of regime legitimacy and 
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international reaction, which was to remain a feature of the South African security 
environment for the next 30 years. 
The Sharpeville massacre, widely publicized by the media focused international 
attention on the apartheid system.  Pretoria found itself diplomatically isolated and faced 
with threats to its security and economic growth.  International capital, which had played 
a significant part in South African economic development since the nineteenth century, 
began to disappear.  The United Nations, its ranks enlarged by new African and Asian 
states, sent Pretoria a clear message when the General Assembly, by a vote of ninety-six
to one, passed a resolution that requested all states “to consider taking separate and 
collective action…to bring about the abandonment of apartheid policies.”60 
Because of the events in 1960, police training underwent significant 
militarization.  Sharpeville proved to apartheid authorities that equipment and tactics for 
public-order policing were inadequate.  The SAP began riot-contr l training that same 
year at the Police College.  Riot training became part of normal training for recruits, and 
the period of training was extended from six months to a year to accommodate the 
changes in curriculum.  Training was militarized, with emphasis on the use of force as a 
first resort and within a few years “the SAP was congratulating itself that its basic 
training for policemen was considered by military experts to be one of the toughest 
military oriented training courses in the world.”61  Firearms training also underwent 
militarization and now included qualification with machine-guns.  To accompany the 
SAP’s new training, new equipment was purchased in addition to firearms.  By 1967, the 
SAP’s stock of vehicles included 129 riot lorries, 151 riot trucks, 417 riot land rovers, 80 
Saracen armored vehicles, two airplanes and two helicopters.62  
To reinforce its militarization, the SAP underwent significant reorganization and 
integration of state security forces.  The 1969 Public Service Amendment Act established 
the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) to coordinate military intelligence and the SAP’s 
intelligence, known as the Special Branch (SB).  BOSS was accorded various powers 
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including the prosecution of anyone in possession of documents or information relating to 
the police and was thought contrary to the interests of the country.  Additionally, the titles 
and ranks of SAP officers were changed to reflect those of the army, such as major, 
captain, warrant officers, etc.  The Defence Amendment Act of 1961 provided for the 
appointment of an interdepartmental committee to coordinate internal security work 
between the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the SAP.  By 1973, the SADF’s 
“Departmental Strategic Plan” required the SADF to assist the SAP at all times, both in 
counterinsurgency and preserving internal order.  Furthermore, in 1975, servicemen were 
regularly transferred from the SADF to the SAP to offset the manpower shortage in the 
police force.63  
By 1970, anti-terrorism training was the most popular in-service course offered at 
the Police College.  That year, 2,300 officers attended the course that year.  Training 
lasted four weeks and included: familiarization with “bush” terrain; the use of special 
weaponry, such as mortars, anti-personnel mines, and hand-grenades; skills in self-
defense; and survival.64  The emphasis of this training demonstrates the SAP’s 
reevaluation of policing priorities.  The threat was external and military.  The danger that 
it could become internal required considerable focus on suppression of political activity 
inside South Africa and the tight control of the country’s black citizenry by means of 
administrative regulations.   
In terms of both police resources and effort, ordinary crime was relatively 
ignored.  When it was dealt with, the police used paramilitary methods as if ordinary 
crime was considered a form of guerrilla insurgency.  The police thought themselves 
effective at ordinary crime fighting as rank- nd-file policeman boasted of their 
relentlessly hunting down murderers, burglars, and rapists.  Crime was endemic to South 
Africa’s social condition, and the SAP was helpless when dealing with crime as a pure 
policing problem.65 
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3. “Total Strategy” – 1976-1992 
On 16 June 1976, secondary school students in Soweto, a black township on the 
edge of Johannesburg, peacefully marched in protest to the government’s insistence on 
the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction.  By the time the young students reached 
Orlando West High School, their numbers had grown to about 14,000.  Police forces 
clashed with the school children, opening fire into the crowd.  Soweto’s children were 
treated as if they were insurgents.  Rioting ensued and spread like wildfire.  Student 
uprisings spread nationwide.  Hundreds of thousands of workers then went on strike in 
solidarity with the students, thousands of whom fled the country and joined the liberation 
forces.  By November 1976, nearly one million people in over two hundred communities 
had directly protested against apartheid policies in a way that had not been seen before.  
Suddenly, the police had to switch from the external guerrilla threat to an internal threat.  
But, they continued to perceive crowds of residents in the same manner they perceived 
guerrillas.  By the end of 1977, the government was responsible for more than 575 deaths 
and over 2,400 wounded.66 
The aftermath of Soweto and the ensuing events revealed the weaknesses of 
policing under apartheid:  the police were cruel and brutal in relying on a strategy of 
violence as a first resort, professionally undeveloped, understaffed in terms of regular 
manpower, administratively incompetent, and lacking in legitimacy.  Additionally, 
although policemen were regularly brought up on charges before the courts for their 
alleged brutal behavior, they were given undue leniency and often absolved of complete 
wrongdoing even in the face of obvious cover- ps.  Steve Biko’s death offers a poignant 
example.   
Biko, founder and leader of the Black Consciousnes  movement, was tortured to 
death in police custody on 12 September 1977.  Immediately following Biko’s death, the 
police denied that his death was the result of head injuries.  When it became clear that the 
cause of Biko’s death was suspicious, charges were brought against the police involved.  
In a five-minute inquest verdict, the magistrate accepted the police version and cleared 
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them of any responsibility or criticism.  The verdict is all the more alarming for the 
following reasons:  the police had admitted to keeping Biko naked in his cell in leg-iro s 
and chained to a grill; the prison doctor admitted that Biko should have been sent to the 
hospital but the police initially refused; and when he was finally dispatched to the 
hospital, he was carried in the back of an open van for 1,200 kilometers without medical 
supplies or supervision.  To further inhibit public criticism over Biko’s death and the 
absolving of the police involved, the government banned nineteen organizations in 
October 1977, including the two most widely read African newspapers.67  
International opposition to apartheid strengthened because of these events, and a 
mandatory UN arms embargo was imposed in November 1977, capital investment 
dwindled even further, and tens of thousands of young South Africans were bloodied in 
the struggle against apartheid.  The atmosphere in government circles was one of crisis 
management.  The government, acting on police and BOSS intelligence, blamed the 
violence on agitators and their communist ties.  The belief that th  country was besieged 
by communist enemies, known as “Total Onslaught,” required a “Total War” response, 
both regionally and domestically.  It was in this context that Prime Minister P.W. Botha 
brought the SADF to the center of the state decision making network and opened the way 
for the implementation of reforms and repression surrounding “Total Strategy.”68 
The reforms entailed changes to homeland policies, urbanization, trade unions and 
labor, regional development, and changes in the Constitution.  The reforms were 
popularly referred to as a strategy “to win the hearts and minds.”  However, the state 
made it absolutely clear that reform could only proceed once law and order was restored.  
The SADF played a central role in the coordination and in egr tion of Total Strategy and 
largely included the militarization of the entire state apparatus.  This process involved the 
diversion of state resources from civilian to security functions, military conscription of 
white males, and increased military influence over the state, the media, and the economy.  
The proportion of state spending earmarked for defense and law and order rose sharply 
(with defense being given priority in funding increases) during the late 1970s and 1980s, 
rising as high as 28 percent of total state expenditure.  Complex protectionist measures 
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were introduced as billions of rands were pumped into the arms industry and other 
strategically important industries.  Approximately half of the defense budget was 
allocated to a Defence Special A count, which was used to purchase arms related 
materiel.  The South African Armaments Corporation (Armscor) embarked on a program 
of rapid expansion and diversification in an effort to offset the effects of the mandatory 
UN arms embargo.  By 1984, it had grown to be the third largest industrial enterprise in 
the country and claimed to be the world’s tenth largest arms industry.69 
The effect of militarism on white society and on policing was displayed 
noticeably through South Africa’s conscription policies. From a white male population 
of about two and a half million, more than half a million were conscripted at any one time 
into active or reserve forces.  Although most of Western Europe also had policies on 
conscription, South Africa’s was peculiar in the following way.  Conscripts could elect to 
serve their duty in the SAP or the SADF.  Furthermore, to help with police manpower 
shortages, armed forces personnel could transfer from the SADF to the SAP.  
Nevertheless, fears that people were using the SAP as a means of skipping national 
service prompted the government to impose different service requirements for the SADF 
and SAP.  Those who elected to do national service in the SAP rather than the SADF 
were required to serve double the normal period of time.70 
Although the black liberation forces never really posed a serious military threat to 
the apartheid regime (in contrast to El Salvador’s FMLN), the political effects of its 
revolutionary effort in the second half of the 1980s persuaded white South African 
leaders that they needed to make compromises with the liberation movement.  Even 
though Total Strategy involved a regional belligerence towards its neighbors, 
centralization of strategic decision making and increased domestic military mobilization 
created a political opening that mass movements wasted little time in utilizing to their 
advantage.  These factors led to the nation-wide uprising, which began in the Vaal 
Triangle in October 1984.  The government, determined not to let the rebellion get out of 
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control, imposed a national State of Emergency, which was to continue until 1991.  This 
was a turning point in Total Strategy.71 
A renewed emphasis on counterinsurgency and counterrevolution came into 
effect.  The counterrevolutionary strategy adopted during the State of Emergency was 
implemented through the National Security Management System (NSMS), becoming 
fully operative in 1986.  The NSMS was a centralized and hierarchical organization of 
committees staffed by bureaucrats and security officials and was responsible for 
coordinating and implementing the Emergency.  The State Security Council (SSC) was at 
the peak of the NSMS, and a national Joint Management Committee (JMC) coordinated 
11 regional JMCs, 60 sub-JMCs corresponding to police divisions, and over 350 mini-
JMCs at the municipal or local level.  Each JMC consisted of police officers, military 
officers, intelligence officials, and civilian bureaucrats.  The consequences of the State of 
Emergency were the increase in police powers and brutality, expansion of the state’s 
policing capacity using the SADF, and that the security forces were drawn increasingly 
into a direct political role inside the state apparatus.72   
The NSMS had four major objectives during the State of Emergency.  First was 
the restoration of physical control over the townships, achieved by the deployment of 
overwhelming force, imposition of curfews and roadblocks, and the banning of 
gatherings.  The second objective was the removal of revolutionary leaders and structures 
that support them.  Third was a “counterorganizing” and reintroduction of compliant 
local leadership and new administrative structures.  In this pursuit, rapid training of black 
police auxiliaries was undertaken, as was the encouragement of local vigilante 
organizations.  Most important and yet most ineffective, the fourth counterrevolutionary 
initiative was the effort to deal with the grievances of the revolutionaries.  This initiative 
proved a failure as economic sanctions, a shrinking economy, and increased military 
expenditure guaranteed inadequate funding to make it effective.73 
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4. The Cold War – Competing Interests 
U.S. relations with South Africa during this period reflected a conflicting mixture 
of ideological and practical concerns.  Ideologically, South Africa’s apartheid 
government was an embarrassment to the United States.  Committed to racial equality at 
home, the United States had an interest in the creation of pro-Western, n n-racial 
democracy in South Africa.  Practically, Soviet involvement in African insurgency efforts 
was viewed as a threat to U.S. economic and security interests in the region.  For the 
Soviets, apartheid represented a “golden opportunity” to further their own interests in 
Africa.  The liberation movement of the ANC sought Soviet aid in ther struggles against 
minority rule, not only in South Africa, but also in the neighboring countries of Angola 
and Mozambique.  In order to offset Soviet influence in Africa, and to safeguard its other 
interests in the region (namely, strategic minerals and the security of the sea lines of 
communication around the Cape of Good Hope), the United States afforded varying 
degrees of accommodation and cooperation to South Africa well into the 1980s.74  
Military, nuclear, intelligence, trade, and investment links betwee  the U.S. and South 
Africa continued throughout the Cold War, with the exception of the U.N. arms embargo 
of 1977.75  Cold War ideology and competing international support justified and 
increased the use of military tactics and weapons by the South African Police.  
C. LEGACY OF TWO AUTHOR ITARIAN PASTS  
El Salvador and South Africa share many characteristics, which contributed to the 
abuse of human rights and repression of a large number of their civilian populations by 
the police and armed forces.  In general, both Salvadoran and South African security 
forces became highly militarized and shared three main characteristics.  First, the 
institutional boundaries between the internal security forces in both countries became 
unclear and indistinct.  Military officers held supervisory and command roles within each 
countries’ police forces.  In El Salvador, the police were directly under the control of the 
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military.  In South Africa, the police and the military were under separate ministries, 
however, military officers held most of the supervisory positions, and the ability to 
transfer between the military and the police was built in to the conscription policies.  
Second, the internal security forces were deprofessionalized in the sense that they were 
inadequately equipped and ill-trained in the performance of ordinary police work.  
Although internal security forces were highly trained in the use of military weapons and 
tactics, they lacked training in routine police investigation and procedures.  Additionally, 
the military weapons and vehicles were not designed for minimal use of force and routine 
patrol.  Third, the internal security forces of El Salvador and South Africa lacked 
meaningful transparency and oversight mechanisms to keep them accountable to the 
communities they were supposed to serve.  This was not even possible because there was 
no political accountability within these authoritarian regimes.  Instead, both states relied 
on repression to keep control of the excluded portions of society.  The internal security 
forces mirrored the state- oci ty relationship. 
International actors have contributed to the militarization of internal security 
forces in the two countries.  The United States sided with the rightist governments and 
the Soviet Union supported the armed opposition encouraging the use of military tactics 
and weapons by the police to control each country’s internal conflict.  Cold War ideology 
justified the increased militarization of internal security forces. 
The interesting difference between El Salvador nd South Africa lies in the 
relationship between the military and the police forces.  In El Salvador, the military 
subsumed the police forces under the Ministry of War in order to prevent the 
manipulation of the police by the political party in power, which had occurred under the 
Martínez government from 1932 to 1944.  The result is that the military retained direct 
control of the police.  In South Africa, this was not the case, as the military and the police 
have always been under separate ministries.  Although boundaries between the military 
and police were blurred in a number of ways – personnel transfers between the military 
and police, military supervisory positions, militarized training and weapons – the police 
were not under the control of the mili ary.  As a result, there is reason to believe that 
South Africa will not face much opposition from the military in its police reform efforts.  
El Salvador’s military, on the other hand, will likely feel threatened by police reform 
40 
measures that dissolve large portions of their organization, and reduce their influence 
over internal security. 
The next chapter contains a detailed explanation of the transitions to democracy 
and the internal security reform measures of El Salvador and South Africa.  The end o  
the Cold War saw an end to the competing support for the internal conflicts of each 
country and opened the door to democratization.  The end of internal conflict in El 
Salvador and South Africa, and their transitions to democracy placed reform of their 





III.  TRANSITION TO DEMOCR ACY AND INTERNAL 
SECURITY REFORM  
War transitions, where regime change occurs in conjunction with the  termination 
of conflict, provide key opportunities for major reforms in internal security apparatuses.  
Most democratic transitions provide openings for reform since they are times of 
redefining power and the concepts of internal security.  War transitions, in particular, 
have police reform at the center of the agenda, since i ternal security structures continue 
to play a key role in active conflict in the latter stages of the authoritarian regime.  (In 
contrast to most other authoritarian regimes where police repression is heaviest in the 
period immediately following the seizure of power.)76   
El Salvador and South Africa are examples of war transitions where conflict ends 
in negotiated settlement.  Negotiated settlements provide increased opportunities for 
internal security reform because military prerogatives and contestatio  are r duced 
allowing demilitarizing reforms to occur.77  In these cases, post-c nflict reforms reflect 
the balance of interests between the opposing parties.78  Neither side in El Salvador and 
South Africa achieved the political-military defeat of its enemy, which would have 
allowed the victor to implement its own overall political vision.  Rather, each side was 
obliged to compromise and accept substantially less than their original demands.   
Although negotiated war transitions provide opportunities for reform, the actual 
degree and nature of internal security reforms will depend on the balance of power of key 
actors affected by the reform.  The foundational elections, taking place in 1994 in both 
countries help describe this balance of power.  In El Salvador, the first round of voting in 
the presidential elections resulted in the ARENA party gaining 49%, the FMLN 25%, and 
the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 16 % of the votes cast.  Following a “run-off” 
contest on 24 April, Armando Calderón Sol, the ARENA candidate, was elected 
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President, with 68.2% of the votes cast, campared with 31.6% for the FMLN candidate.79  
In South Africa, elections in April resulted in the ANC gaining 63% of the vote.  The 
National Party (NP) was the only other significant contendi g political party closing with 
just 20% of the poll.80  The results of these elections show that in El Salvador, the 
balance of power was tipped in favor of the rightist government, while in South Africa, 
the rightist government was discredited and the opposition (ANC) held the overwhelming 
power.   
Negotiations of internal security reforms in El Salvador involved the interests and 
power of the government, military (which included the police), armed insurgents and the 
international community.  During negotiations, the influence of the government and their 
armed forces were dominant.  The government and military wanted the demobilization of 
the armed insurgents, or FMLN.  Although in a weaker position, the FMLN pushed for 
the dissolution of all the internal s curity forces and the creation of an entirely new police 
force in which they could participate.  The FMLN pushed for sweeping change fearing 
that this would be their only opportunity to have their demands met.  The United Nations 
was instrumental in promoting the compromise that was needed for agreement between 
both sides and its involvement led to a much more radical reform of the internal security 
apparatus than would have occurred in its absence.  The resulting agreement reflected not 
only the demobilization of the FMLN sought by the government, but also detailed and 
comprehensive changes to the internal security apparatus demanded by the FMLN.  El 
Salvador’s internal security reform could be characterized by a “shock treatment” 
approach – radical changes in the internal security apparatuses were called for in a 
relatively short period of time.  
In South Africa, the balance of power between advocates and opponents of police 
reform was quite different.  South Africa’s apartheid government was discredited as a 
repressive and exclusionary regime that needed changing.  Oppositional forces enjoyed 
the overwhelming support of the population.  As a result, the ANC did not feel compelled 
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to negotiate all facets of reform prior to the upcoming elections, as they realized that their 
political party and interests would be likely to dominate in the upcoming elections.  The 
United Nations helped in the negotiation of peace; however, the peace agreement reached 
was not nearly as detailed and comprehensive as in El Salvdor. Instead, South Africa’s 
police reform was more gradual and the ANC kept police reform on the agenda in the 
years following the transition.   
 The degree to which the reforms are implemented is dependent on the balance of 
power among the key actors affected by the reforms.  In El Salvador, the balance of 
power tipped in favor of the ARENA party closely allied with the military meant that the 
negotiated radical reforms became less so.  In South Africa, the confident gradualism of 
the ANC led to fewer refo ms than might otherwise have been expected.  Surprisingly, 
both approaches, although very different (radical vs gradual) together with the different 
balances of power (rightist government vs opposition) produced similar outcomes – 
middle of the road reform measures.  
This chapter discusses the transitions, negotiations, and police reform efforts in El 
Salvador and South Africa.  The roles and interests of the actors affected by the police 
reforms are reflected in the reform efforts achieved.  The sections on each country’s 
reform is organized by the three characteristics of demilitarization.    
A. EL SALVADOR’S NEGOTIATED INTERNAL SEC URITY REFORM  
The UN-mediated settlement in El Salvador ended a long and brutal civil war 
between the Salvadoran army (the Armed Forces of El Salvador, or FAES) and the leftist 
guerrilla resistance movement, or FMLN, which raged on from 1980 to 1992.  The results 
of the war were disastrous.  Over 75,000 civilians and combatants were killed, crops were 
destroyed, and communications, as well as, transport infrastructures were ruined.  Neither 
side had accomplished their political goals. It became evident that all Salvadorans had 
grown weary of a civil war that was destroying the social, political, and economic fabric 
of the country.  
The end of the Cold War saw foreign military support for each side eroding.  
After many years of civil war, negotiations became the preferred option to resolve 
conflict between the government forces and the FMLN.  Serious peace talks began in 
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December 1989 when the government of El Salvador and the FMLN independently 
approached the Secretary General to request that the United Nations provide mediation in 
support of a peace settlement.  This initiative led to 2 years of UN-brokered negotiations 
and the ventual peace accords signed on January 16, 1992 in Chapultepec, Mexico.  The 
Chapultepec accords dealt with the fundamental causes of the war by ending the armed 
conflict; by promoting democratization; by guaranteeing absolute respect for human 
rights; and by reunifying Salvadoran society.  “These objectives are unprecedented; no 
previous civil war has ended with an agreement not simply to stop shooting but to 
restructure society.”81  The focal point of the peace accords was the reform of state 
institutions, and by far the most significant element was the across-t -bo rd 
transformation of the nation’s security system.82   
Historically, El Salvador’s security forces and paramilitary organizations 
maintained internal security under the direct control of the military.  However, under the 
Chapultepec peace accords, the government agreed to the downsizing of the armed forces 
and mechanisms for purging human rights violators, the elimination of the public security 
forces (the National Guard, Treasury Police, and National Police), and the redefinition of 
the role of the military removing all internal security functions except under exceptional 
circumstances.  In place of the former public security forces, an entirely new civilian 
controlled institution; the National Civilian Police (PNC) was created.  It was composed 
primarily of personnel who took no part in the armed conflict on either side.  In 
exchange, the FMLN agreed to a cease-fire nd to the demobilization of their combatants.  
The accords also called for a new training academy with a new doctrine emphasizing the 
protection of individual rights and minimal use of force.83  The implementation of the 
accords was monitored by a Salvadoran agency, the Commission for the Consolidation of 
Peace (COPAZ) and by an observer mission of the United Nations called ONUSAL.  
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The PNC was to be deployed over a two-year period, dating from the opening of 
the National Public Security Academy (ANSP).  During this period, the new PNC, and its 
public safety division gradually deploye throughout the nation.  During the transition, 
the old National Police (PN) continued to function but under supervision of the 277-
member police division (CIVPOL) of ONUSAL.  Conversely, the National Guard and the 
Treasury Police were to be completely abolished.  Additionally, the PN was to be 
demobilized progressively as the PNC took over its functions, although in reality its 
demobilization was considerably delayed.84  
1. Institutional Boundaries in Internal Security Forces:  Creation of a 
New Civilian Police Force 
The accords called for the separation of the police from the military, the 
dissolution of the old security forces and the creation of a new civilian police force, the 
National Civilian Police (PNC), which went to the heart of bringing about fundamental
change in El Salvador.  Limiting the numbers of former police and combatants and 
insisting on their retraining was essential to the urgent task of securing the trust of the 
population and preventing further human rights abuses.  The accords dictatd that former 
FMLN combatants and former PN members were limited to twenty percent membership 
each in the new PNC.  The remaining sixty percent were to be composed of civilians, of 
which fifteen percent were women.85  Entrance education standards were set fo  new 
recruits.  Former police and FMLN combatants were required to meet admission 
standards for the new National Public Security Academy (ANSP) and go through a 
retraining course with emphasis on protection of individual rights, minimal use of force, 
and absolute adherence to apolitical conduct.86   
In addition, part of the reforms called for the reduction and restructuring of the 
military reducing its size by approximately fifty percent to 31,000 over a two-year p iod 
and placing the armed forces under direct civilian control.87  Additionally, the role and 
doctrine of the armed forces was redefined with its primary responsibility now being 
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national defense.  Its role in public security was constitutionally limited to situations of 
national emergency only after notification of the legislature and under strict executive 
control.  Furthermore, the military-cont olled intelligence agency was dissolved and a 
new one set up under civilian control.88  However, despite the wide breadth of changes in 
the accords, the political power of the conflict, and the close alliance between the 
government and the military, meant that any military resistance to reform was likely to 
lead to government inaction in carrying out reforms. 89   
The implementation of the military reforms pr ved to be a tenuous process.  As 
Stepan asserts, reducing the military’s prerogatives often produces an increase in conflict 
between the civilian government and the military.90  However, El Salvador proved to be a 
case where the conflict arising from implementation was not so much between the 
government and the military, but rather between the government and the military on one 
side and the domestic oppositional groups and international actors on the other.  Initial 
problems surfaced over the dismantling of security forces mandated in the accords.  
Instead of dissolving the National Guard and the Treasury Police as per the accords, they 
were renamed (the Frontier Police and Military Police) and incorporated, structurally 
intact, into the army.  As a result, the FMLN accused the army and the Cristiani 
government of slight-of-hand announcing that it would postpone the demobilization of 
the first group of combatants.91   
The military High Command’s reluctance to comply with the accords regarding 
the dismantlig of security forces was a result of two factors.  First, the military looked to 
the security forces as a “bargaining chip” to enforce FMLN demobilization set forth in 
the accords.  Second, the military’s resistance reflected its reluctance “to give up the 
extensive network of social control in the countryside, of which the security forces were 
an integral part.”92  Third, there was significant opposition from within the security 
forces.  In contrast to the Army, the National Guard and Treasury Police had a strong 
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corporate identity and comprised mostly of career officers who would naturally put up 
resistance.93  Nevertheless, by September the National Guard and Treasury Police were 
eliminated, although many former members continued to serve in public security roles.   
El Salvador’s transitional crime problem created significant political pressure on 
the government to take strong measures to protect its citizens.  Full deployment of the 
PNC was the unchallenged, long term, best strategy toward professional crime fighti g 
and deepening of democracy.  However, the early month’s of transition forced the 
Salvadoran government to rely on the PN closely monitored by ONUSAL’s CIVPOL.  
However, the military, in confrontation with the government, refused to provide needed 
vehicles and equipment needed for PN operations.  Rather than dealing head on with the 
military and the Defense Ministry, the Salvadoran government responded by increasing 
PN’s personnel and transferring 932 Treasury Police and 116 National Guard to augment 
the PN, sometimes keeping entire companies intact and merely changing their 
uniforms.94   
The UN challenged this clear violation of the peace accords.  They also 
questioned the intent of the government to comply with the requirement to demobilize the 
PN by September 1994.  The old National Police training school continued to produce 
nearly 100 new policemen per month until the end of 1993.  The Cristiani administration 
was responsible in delaying the demobilization plan by over one year to March 1995.  
However, the political tide finally began to turn against the PN when incoming President 
Armando Calderón Sol ordered an accelerated demobilization of the PN following a 
widely televised armored car robbery carried out by uniformed PN agents.  The Calderón 
administration committed increasing resources to the PNC, expanding the budget 
dramatically between 1995- 6.  The main equipment shortages were resolved and the 
financing sufficient to enable the PNC to expand, passing 14,000 by 1997.95 
2. Professionalization of Internal Security Forces 
In order to produce fundamental change to the nature and culture of internal 
security forces, there must be extensive training and education programs to ensure that 
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troops and police exhibit levels of professionalism that will inhibi human rights abuses.  
This entails comprehensive training programs, restructured military and police schools, 
professional recruitment and selection processes, and reform-mi ed leadership. 
a. Armed Forces Professionalization 
As part of the accords the armed forces’ educational system was to be 
revamped, incorporating into its training programs the new constitutional mission and 
doctrine.  A new academic council for the military academy, made up of civilians and 
military, was tasked with overseeing curriculum, admissions procedures, and faculty 
appointments.96  Additionally, the U.S. military group (MILGROUP) in El Salvador, 
operating independent of the UN, was very much involved in professionalization of the 
armed forces.  Their mission included training, advising, and assisting with the 
restructuring of the armed forces.  MILGROUP was instrumental in the creation of a 
senior civilian and military leader school, named the School of High Strategic Studies, 
which opened in September 1993.97   
b. The New Police Academy 
The development of the new National Public Security Academy (ANSP) 
had an ambitious timetable of only three and a half months.  This was due to the overall 
importance of police reform to the peace process and the urgency of completing the 
transition during the brief period of the UN observer mission.  However, there were 
delays from the beginning.  Curriculum development took longer than expected and the 
government initially failed to provide needed funds for such things as recruitment, 
testing, uniforms, and food.  International donors, sensing a lack of commitment from the 
Salvadoran government, held back on providing funds.  The military contributed to 
delays and shortfalls by refusing to hand over the existing public security academy.  In 
fact, the military appropriated this facility as its own new military academy.  
Consequently, the ANSP was forced to set up in a temporary facility at Comalapa on the 
coastal plain, which required an expenditure of $4.5 million dollars to refurbish.98 
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A team of technical experts, five representatives each from Spain and the 
U.S. and seven from El Salvador assisted with the establishment of the Academy.  This 
team was assembled in May 1992 to develop a comprehensive plan for the Academy’s 
lesson plans, disciplinary codes, infrastructure, and budget.  Additionally, two other 
organizations were involved in aiding and monitoring reform operations.  The National 
Commission to Consolidate Peace (COPAZ) was responsible for monitoring the progress 
of the PNC and the Academy.  The U.S. Justice Department’s International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) played an independent role in police 
reform by providing American instructors for the Academy and advising the Director of 
the Academy and PNC.99 
The Academy was set up in semi-per anent facilities, and with delays 
stemming from a number of obstacles ranging from inadequate infrastructure to 
insufficient financing, the first classes began three months behind schedule.  Within 
months, however, the Academy had over 2,200 cadets in residence.100 
c. Civilian Recruitment, Selection, and Training 
The recruitment and testing processes were predictably fraught with 
problems.  Early testing placed an emphasis on physical fitness rather than intellectual 
aptitude.  This resulted in new cadets being unsuited to the demands of the new PNC’s 
emphasis on knowledge of the law, intelligence, and interpersonal skills rather than force.  
ONUSAL and COPAZ criticized the testing process which led to the development of n w 
testing.  Although the Salvadoran government had a large recruitment campaign, the first 
two years of recruiting met with lower numbers of applicants than anticipated due to poor 
public perceptions and low salaries.101   
Controversy also arose over admission procedures and candidate selection.  
ONUSAL reported that large numbers of recruits from the disbanded security forces and 
armed forces were concealing their previous associations and obtaining entrance to the 
Academy.  Additionally, the Academy had a difficult time drawing enough FMLN and 
civilian recruits to offset the overabundance of ex-PN and ex-soldiers who were trying to 
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gain admission.  Upon ONUSAL’s recommendation, the government bolstered its 
recruiting campaign with visits to low turn- ut areas offering increased pay and benefits 
for PNC members.102 
The ANSP’s quality of training has received mixed reviews.  The 
monumental effort of training a completely new police force in two years is certainly 
commendable.  However, the early classes had been trained without access to basic 
policing tools such as, handcuffs, batons, fingerprinting sets, basic crime lab equipment, 
photography lab, vehicles, driving track, adequate firearms and shooting range.  
Furthermore, training in the legalities of how p lice officers should conduct themselves 
was lacking, resulting in graduates poorly trained in criminal procedure.  ONUSAL 
officials believed these deficiencies led to lapses in due process protections and more 
serious human rights violations emerging in late 1993.103 
Puerto Rico and Spain have provided some of the best training for the new 
PNC.  At an academy in Puerto Rico, 60 officers received an accelerated training course 
to serve as transitional commanders during the initial deployment of the first PNC 
contingents.  Officers who attended this program were unanimously positive about the 
experience.  Foreign instructors from Spain, Chile, and the United States were brought in 
to the ANSP filling crucial gaps in the training and instruction of the PNC.104  However, 
this proved to be a mixed blessing in that there were disagreements and lack of 
coordination among various international contingents as to the content of training, such 
as what model of policing (i.e. human rights emphasis or community policing) should be 
emphasized.105 
d. Civilian Leadership within the Old and New Police 
By the end of 1993, the early successes of the PNC were in danger of 
being reversed.  There were several factors, which contributed to this fear.  The PNC was 
deployed in only about half of the country.  Elsewhere, especially in San Salvador, the 
old National Police were still in charge of public security functions.  Although the 
                                         
102 McCormick, 300. 
103 Stanley and Call, 114. 
104 Stanley and Call, 114. 
105 McCormick, 301. 
51 
National Police was moved to the Ministry of Interior, a retired Colonel headed the 
Ministry.  Furthermore, the director of the National Police was an active duty officer.106  
In January 1994, the government announced the suspension of PN’s demobilization, 
claiming they were needed due to the soaring crime rates.   
The appointment of the former head of the narco ics division (UEA), 
Captain Oscar Peña Durán, as Sub-Director of PNC operations, unfavorably affected the 
UN’s ability to oversee the deployment of the new PNC.  Although Peña Durán was more 
experienced than any civilian competitor for his new position, his appoi tment was in 
direct violation of the peace accords that civilians command the PNC.  Furthermore, he 
proved to be disastrous to the development of the PNC with his political bias, militarism, 
and disregard for human rights.  His actions quickly eroded the international community 
efforts at instilling democratic values in the PNC.  The most costly of his actions was his 
severing relations with ONUSAL, whose resources and technical assistance were the 
most substantial contribution by the international community.  Eventually, he resigned 
under pressure from the UN in May 1994.  Newly elected President Armando Calderón 
Sol publicly voiced his unequivocal support for the PNC and took steps to demobilize the 
PN by December 31, 1994.107 
3. Establishment of Mechanisms of Accountability 
The establishment of any democratic institution necessarily must include the 
development of meaningful mechanisms of accountability.  Accountability mechanisms 
must first deal with past abuses, identifying and in many cases purging th  inte nal 
security forces of perpetrators.108  Second, institutions of accountability must be given 
priority to ensure that advances in other areas of reform are not reversed and human 
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rights abuses are not allowed in the future.  Ideally, this should include both external and 
internal mechanisms of accountability. 
a. Ad Hoc Commission, Truth Commission, and Joint Group 
In keeping with the accords, the Ad Hoc Commission was established to 
“purify” the armed forces.  Made up of three prominent Salvadorans appointed by the 
U.N. Secretary-General and approved by President Alfredo Cristiani, the Commission 
was established to oversee the restructuring of the armed forces.  Its task was to review 
the human rights records, professional competence, and suitability of all military officers 
for continued service in the armed forces and submit their recommendations in a 
confidential report to the President and the Secretary-General.  Due to the sheer numbers 
involved, the Commission, however, chose to review only 232 records of mostly senior 
officers.  The report submitted to President Cristiani on September 23, 1992 
recommended the discharge of 102 senior officers and the reassignment of 40 others 
including the Minister of Defense, General René Emilio Ponce.109 
President Cristiani rejected the Commission’s recommendations, 
requesting the Secretary General’s approval to allow the most powerful officers to retain 
their posts until August 1993.  Tensions mounted as the Secretary General refused 
Cristiani’s request, and in October 1992, Cristiani agreed to dismiss the officers by the 
end of the year.  However, senior military officers pressured Cristiani with implications 
that the Commission had not respected the legal rights of officers and failed to give them 
reasons for their dismissals.  After a second round of negotiations, Cristiani finally 
complied, and on July 1, 1993, he replaced the Minister of Defense with retired Colonel 
Humberto Corado Figueroa.110  The manner in which this situation was handled by the 
government raised doubts about whether the peace process had really cemented civilian 
control over the military. 
The Truth Commission was a complement to the Ad Hoc Commission, 
composed of foreign commissioners selected by the Secretary-Gen ral.  Their objective 
was to “investigate serious acts of violence that had occurred since 1980 and whose 
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impact on society urgently required that the public should know the truth.”111  T is 
included some of the most notorious cases including the murder of six Jesuit priests in 
1989 and the killing of four U.S. marines in San Salvador in 1985.  The Commission was 
to uncover the truth about the worst cases of abuse committed by the military, the police, 
and the FMLN.  Most of the information was gathered on a confidential basis to alleviate 
fears of repercussion, which meant that the accused did not have a chance to confront 
their accusers.  Overall, the Commission received over 22,000 complaints of various acts 
of violence, which occurred during the civil war period.   
In addition to shedding light on past atrocities, the Commission made 
numerous far-reaching recommendations, specifically:  the dismissal from the armed 
forces or civil service, and disqualification from public office for ten years of all persons 
named in the report; the resignation of all members of the Supreme Court; 
deconcentration of power of the Supreme Court; investigation of death squad activity; 
new legislation guaranteeing due process in the criminal justice system; and ratification 
of human rights instruments and acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.112  The Secretary-General had hoped that the Truth 
Commission Report would be a watershed in the process of reuniting Salvadoran society.  
However, the government’s reaction was dismissive.  Members of the Supreme Court 
denounced it and President Cristiani called for an amnesty immediately before the report 
was released.113  Furthermore, many of the recommended structural changes were 
impossible to put into effect immediately as the required constitutional amendments, 
which would take two successive legislatures to ratify.114 
From August to November 1993, ONUSAL received forty-seven 
complaints of possible political homicides being carried out by “death squads,” which 
prompted the establishment of a Joint Group to conduct the investigations.  The Joint 
Group was created in December 1993 and composed of two independent nominees by 
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President Cristiani, the El Salvador human rights ombudsman and the Director of 
ONUSAL’s Human Rights Division.  Their task was to investigate the activities of “death 
squads” from January 16, 1992 (the signing of the Peace Accords) to the present. 
The Joint Group’s report issued in July 1994 verified that “death squads” 
continued to exist after the signing of the Peace Accords, but that the organs of the state 
generally were not involved.  However, the report did find that illegal armed groups 
continued to exist under the umbrella of some members of the armed forces and the 
National Police and that the justice system “continued to provide the margin of impunity 
these structures require.”  The Joint Group recommended three main changes:  (1) the 
creation of a special unit within the Criminal Investigation Division (DIC) of the PNC to 
continue investigations; (2) the utilization of the human rights ombudsman to monitor the 
investigations; and (3) the elimination of all magistrates and judges who were involved in 
legal infractions or professional misconduct.115  
b. International Verification – ONUSAL 
The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) began work in July 
1991, prior to the cease-fire, but was expanded to include military and police divisions 
once the Peace Accords were signed.  The Military Division was responsible for 
verifying the separation of forces, and the demobilization of FMLN and selected military 
and security force units.  Upon initial glance, it would appear that the Salvadoran 
government implemented the majority of the required structural and doctrinal changes 
within the armed forces.  ONUSAL “verified” that the armed forces had reduced its 
personnel by more than fifty percent as of March 31, 1993, almost a year in advance of 
schedule.  However, the drastic reduction in forces in such a short amount of time might 
not have been as dramatic as it first appeared.  The FAES had initially claimed a total of 
63,175 soldiers at the time of the ceasefire, but evidence seems to suggest that these 
numbers may have been inflated.116 
                                         
115 Johnstone, 324. 
116 It was discovered that the former Bracamonte Battalion Barracks, subsequently vacated for the 
establishment of the National Public Security Academy, was inadequate for a battalion-sized unit.  Cited in 
D. H. McCormick, “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding:  Restructuring Military and Police Institutions in 
El Salvador,” in Doyle, Johnstone, and Orr, 295 and fn49 on the same page.    
55 
During this period, the Military Division of ONUSAL also verified the 
dissolution of the military structure of the FMLN.  Throughout demobilization, ONUSAL 
and the FAES accused the FMLN of keeping large quantities of military weaponry.  
However, despite government protests, ONUSAL finally accepted the FMLN’s claims 
and officially verified its weapons inventory on December 14, 1992.  Six months later, an 
undisclosed FMLN weapons supply exploded in Managua, and subsequently, numerous 
other caches were found.  Both examples raised concern over the intrinsic limitations of 
verification procedures.117 
The ONUSAL Police Division was tasked with assisting in the transition 
to a new civilian public security regime.  The Police Division was to have a total of 631 
police observers, almost twice the number authorized for the Military Division.  The idea 
was that the Police Division would need to deploy throughout the country, whereas the 
government and guerrilla forces were confined to a small number of bases.  The 
ONUSAL Police Division never reached half of its authorized strength.  The main reason 
was the limited number of countries able and willing to send qualified personnel.118 
In general, the police officers sent to El Salvador had adequate 
professional qualifications, however, different foreign police forces’ ranking systems 
created friction in assigning duties and establishing a command hierarchy.  Within 
headquarters, this was managed to some degree by giving each delegation a different 
portfolio such as:  Italians were given charge of personnel, while Spaniards ran 
operations.  However, this was not always practicable, and compromises had to be 
made.119 
Another area worthy of scrutiny was the coordination between the Police 
Division and the Human Rights Division within ONUSAL.  The Police Division’s 
responsibility to oversee the field work of the PN implied close coordination with the 
Human Rights Division to identify and investigate possible abuses involving the police, 
military, and politically motivated groups.  However, these divisions worked separately 
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and did not have the access to each other’s information, which resulted in duplication of 
effort and even conflicting results.120 
c. Human Right Ombudsman, Office of the Inspector General, and 
Office of Internal Affairs and Discipline 
An important aspect of the agreement on legal and constitutional reform 
was the creation of the National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights (ombudsman), 
headed by Dr Eduardo Molina.  The ombudsman was given powers to investigate cases, 
promote judicial or administrative remedies, monitor state institutions, recommend 
legislation, and propose systemic reforms.  However, financial constraints contributed to 
a slow start and slow development.  By June 1994, only five regional offices were 
activated, three of which were opened in the preceding two months.  The goal of setting 
up one office in each of El Salvador’s fourteen departments was not reached until 
1995.121   
The ombudsman lack both moral and legal authority, thus undermining his 
ability to act as a check on the police.  Non-governmental human rights groupsexpre sed 
concern over Dr Molina’s lack of experience and questioned his firmness for the job.  In 
response, Dr Molina acted with extreme caution carrying out his role “discreetly” rather 
than through public confrontation.  However, more seriously, he did not rate very high 
with other organs of the state as officials felt free to ignore his non-binding 
recommendations.122 
Towards the end of its peacekeeping mission, the tide began to turn when 
the U.N. increased funding and renewed efforts to strengthen the ombudsman’s office.  
This coupled with the Joint Group participation increased its responsibilities and level of 
activity.  In March 1995, Ms. Victoria Maria de Avilés was elected as the new 
ombudswoman.  Her legal expertise and commitment to human rights was widely 
recognized.  However, her personal commitment was not in step with the government’s 
and she had to rely largely on international funding.123 
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The internal institutions of accountability were slow to develop, which 
was partially responsible for the rise in PNC abuses.  An Inspector General Office was 
not created until the Administration of President Calderón Sol.  The Inspector General 
was appointed in June 1994, a full eighteen months after the first PNC agents were 
deployed.  Additionally, the lack of a working Office for Internal Affairs and Discipline 
during the first year of the PNC’s operation likely contributed to lax standards of conduct 
evident in the nascent months of the new police force.  The delay in formation of these 
institutions can be attributed in part to government reluctance.  However, the rush to 
deploy operational units coupled with an over reliance on the UN Police and Human 
Rights Divisions already deployed throughout the countryside are also to blame for the 
delays.124 
B. SOUTH AFRICA’S NEGOTIATED INTE RNAL SECURITY REFORM  
The problems and challenges facing South African security policy today have 
their origins in the apartheid era, especially the militarization that took place in the “Total 
Strategy” period from 1977 to 1989.  It was then that the present character of the armed 
forces and civilian police forces were largely determined.  With the demise of Total 
Strategy and the onset of negotiations to end apartheid, which eventually led to the 
installation of the ANC-led Government of National Unity in May 1994, the South 
African security environment changed profoundly.  However, in contrast to El Salvador’s 
“shock treatment” reform strategy, the nature of South Africa’s security reform was 
incremental and thus manageable by the existing power structures.  Under de Klerk, 
debate and reappraisals of potential threats took place within the security forces where 
the idea of a “total onslaught” finally gave way to a more complex appreciation of 
“threats.”  This understanding played an import t role in the reorientation and redesign 
of the security forces.125  
Police reform began well before South Africa’s transition to democracy.  Frederik 
de Klerk won the national presidency in September 1989 in the midst of unresolved 
crisis.  The 1989 election saw four times as many people on strike that day than those 
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who voted.  The Weekly Mail headline reporting on the results of the election read, “Nat:  
93, Con: 39, Dem:  33, Hurt:  100, Dead:  23.”126  Although de Klerk inherited the same 
problems and personnel as the cabinet of his antecedent, his style and policies were 
completely different.  De Klerk set out to change the SAP from above.  He ordered 
commissions of inquiry to investigate public violence and accusations of police death 
squads.  He sweetened this announcement by following up with a seventy-nine p rcent 
increase in pay for the police and a promise to increase manpower by ten thousand in the 
first year by shifting expenditure from defense to the police.  De Klerk attempted to 
demilitarize the SAP by removing them from border duty in 1990 and announced that 
policing emphasis would shift from a focus on political activity towards combating 
ordinary crime.127   
However, de Klerk’s best intentions at the process of reforming the police did not 
result in diminished violence and his conservative economic modernization plans did not 
fare well.  In response, the business community pursued negotiation over confrontation, 
not only in the workplace but also in politics.  National Party leaders reluctantly decided 
that their future was better ensured by engagement with the ANC.  Changes in elite 
interests were brought about by the threat mobilization by township residents and 
workers posed.  This motivated the powerful members of the economic elite to push 
regime elites towards compromise.  “Indeed, the bargaining between business and labor 
that preceded and then paralleled the political negotiations reinforced mutual confidence 
that compromise on the terms of the transition was possible.”128 
During the first few months of 1991, increasing violence was destabilizing 
KwaZulu-Natal and large areas of the Transvaal, and evidence of police involvement in 
the violence was growing.  To address this issue the ANC agreed to a peace summit at 
which a formally binding agreement between themselves and the government could be 
reached.  Following long and bitter negotiations, all parties signed a National Peace 
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Accord on 14 September 1991.  The agreement contained “general provisions” which 
included the following pertaining to the police:  “The police shall endeavor to protect the 
people of South Africa from all criminal acts and shall do so in a rigorously non-partisan 
fashion…The police shall be guided by the belief that they are accountable to 
society…and shall conduct themselves so as to secure and retain the respect and approval 
of the public…the police shall endeavor to obtain the cooperation of the public whose 
partnership in the task of crime control and prevention is essential…”129 
The National Peace Accord provided a co e of conduct for the police that  
emphasized preservation of constitutional rights, securing the favor and approval of the 
public, minimum use of force, sensitivity to the balance between individual freedom and 
collective security, and professionalism and honesty.  The core criticism of the code at 
the time was that it did not provide concrete mechanisms of enforcement, nor incentives 
for compliance.  However, there is little dispute that the Accord and the code of conduct 
provided the vision for police reform.  The key principles in these documents are those 
that embody all models of community policing:  accountability, integrity, impartiality, 
and effective service.130 
1. Institutional Boundaries in Internal Security Forces  
South Africa’s democratization process includes the demilitarization of its 
internal security forces and establishment of civil-military relations that reflect 
democratic norms.  Democratic civil-military relations involve restrictions on the security 
forces’ political activities and civilian control over the military and police institutions.  
Civilian control of security forces is a two-fold issue.  First, it involves civilian control of 
the security forces and the development of doctrine that will help shape the force design.  
The second key issue is the composition of the forces, which guarantees the maintenance 
of an “interethnic distribution of power.”131  The implication is that civil-military 
transition involves institutional change within the military and the police forces. 
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a. Civil-Military Relations and Integration 
Like the police reform measures, armed forces reforms began before the 
elections in 1994.  The framework for a new defense and security policy was established 
after the installation of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in October 1993, a 
multi-party body that effectively ran the country preceding the April 1994 elections.  
Policy was debated and determined collectively by the ANC, the National Party (NP), the 
homeland governments, the SADF, and the SAP.  The TEC Sub-Council on Defence and 
the Joint Military Coordinating Committee (JMCC) were tasked with drawing up a threat 
analysis upon which the new defense policy would be planned.  The culmination of these 
efforts were detailed in the 1994-19 5 annual report, suitably titled, The National 
Defence Force in Transition.132  
One aspect of structural change was that of the organization of the 
Ministry of Defence and the SANDF.  These structural changes, which took effect in 
March 1995, entailed the establishment of a “balanced” structure, headed by a civilian 
minister of defense, and assisted by a deputy minister.  The Ministry would comprise the 
SANDF and the new civilian Defence Secretariat.  The “balance” would occur within the 
Department of Defence, with the armed forces (military) on one hand and the Secretariat 
(civilian) on the other.  This marked a departure from the past, when a civilian minister 
(most often with military experience) lead a ministry that was totally dominated by the 
military, had no civilian representation, and was subject to no effective means of 
financial or policy accountability.133 
South Africa’s reform efforts involved the integration of the old apartheid-
era South African Defence Force (SADF) with the former guerrilla armies of the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC), as well as the armed 
forces of each of the four “homelands” (Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, and Bophuthatswana).  
In the months prior to the April 1994 elections, the senior officers of the various forces 
negotiated a detailed agreement specifying how the new South African National Defence 
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Force (SANDF) would be created out of the integration process that was scheduled to 
follow the elections.  ANC and PAC guerrillas, numbers totaling approximately 28,000 
and 6,000 respectively, were to report in groups of 1,500 at one of three assembly points, 
where they would muster into the new SANDF and undergo a period of review and 
training designed to reduce differences in the different standards of the various forces.  A 
British Military Assistance Training Team was available at each assembly point to ensure 
procedures and standards were fair for all involved.134 
The defense force grew from 84,000 to more than 99,000 by 1 May 1997.  
By this time, former SADF military we e reduced through early retirements and made up 
approximately sixty-five percent of the new SANDF, while twelve percent were former 
ANC or MK members and the rest were from the PAC and homeland defense forces.  An 
Integration Committee, made up of service component representatives of all the former 
forces, was initiated to implement and oversee the integration process.135 
Once integration was concluded, the next part of the integration phase was 
the demobilization of the individuals who did not have the skills, or abilities for 
continued service (mostly due to age, lack of education, and poor health).  To help those 
who were involuntarily separated, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), with cabinet 
approval, launched the Service Corps in January 1995, whose purpose was to help 
integrate ex-military into civil society.  Ex-military were allowed to enter the Service 
Corps where they could work for one year, acquiring vocational training to become job-
competitive upon entering civilian life.  Monetary disbursements, s ch as gratuities, death 
benefits, and separation pay were also granted based upon years of service.136   
Another area of change was redefining the role of the armed forces.  The 
1996 White Paper on defense, “Defence in a Democracy,” and the Constitution stipulate 
the roles and obligations of the armed forces.  The White Paper notes the dramatic 
changes in the external strategic environment from South Africa’s perspective.  The 
                                         
134 Jakkie Cilliers, “Security and Transition in South Africa,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner 
(Editors), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996), 92. 
135 James Winkates, “The Transformation of the South African National Defence Force:  A Good 
beginning,” Armed Forces and Society (Spring 2000):  460. 
136 Winkates, 461. 
62 
absence of a conventional military threat provided the rationale for downsizing, and 
rationalization or “rightsizing” the SANDF.  The white paper points out that “the size, 
design, structure and budget of the SANDF will therefore be determined mainly by its 
primary function,” the defense of the Republic.137  However, the White Paper also notes 
that employment of the SANDF in support of the police is likely to persist, “because of 
ongoing public violence and the relative shortage of police personnel.”138  
The details of the SANDF force design is stipulated in the Defence 
Review 1998, which “rightsizes” the military to approximately 90,000 in total personnel 
strength.  In addition to size is the element of composition, which has been scrutinized 
heavily during this phase of transformation.  The new SANDF, as of 11 May 1997, shows 
an ethnic mix of fifty-six percent African, thirty-one percent white, twelve percent 
colored, and one percent Asian.139  World Factbook 2001 has South Africa’s overall 
ethnic composition at seventy-five percent black, thirteen percent white, nine percent 
colored and three percent Indian.140  During the apartheid era, the SADF was almost 
exclusively white, and these new demographics demonstrate considerable effort to effect 
a more representative military force.   
b. The Interim Constitution and Police Reform  
The first formal reference to community policing and guide to police 
reform was found in the Interim Constitution for the Republic of South Africa, which 
came into force on 27 April 1994,141 and is comparable to the Peace Accords that guided 
police reform in El Salvador.  It provided, for example, fundamental guidelines for the 
reform of public service in general, and the “security services” in particular:  the police 
and defense forces in existence at the time.  Specifically, the new Constitution provided 
for the establishment of a single police service, the South African Police Service (SAPS), 
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instead of the existing eleven agencies.142  The Interim Constitution provided the major 
set of “rules” for the transformation of all state departments.  This has been particularly 
significant for the state’s “coercive instruments,” the police (Department of Safety and 
Security), and the defense force (Department of Defence).  Since 1994, these departments 
have produced numerous policy documents, in order to provide departmental 
perspectives on the interpretation of the Constitution.  The Bill of Rights and the 
fundamental rights embedded in Chapter two of the Constitution have provided a 
powerful framework of values for the reform of statutory and discretionary powers.143 
c. Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)
While often understood as an economic program, the government’s major 
national policy framework, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), also 
exercised a major influence on the goals of police transformation.  With “peace and 
security for all” as one of its six basic principles, the RDP also determined that the police 
must be made more representative of the people, more responsive to human rights, and 
more answerable to the communities they serve.  The SAPS was r quired to transform in 
accordance with the criteria outlined in the White Paper on the reform of the public 
service.144 
The White Paper on Reconstruction and Development published by the 
Government of National Unity in September 1994 declared optimistically:  
The policy framework behind the renewal, which transforms 
society, is the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).  The 
RDP offers our country a unique opportunity to bring about renewal, 
peace, prosperity, reconciliation, and stability.  It is the product of ongoing 
consultation and it enjoys widespread support from all sectors of our 
society.  It has been adopted and supported by all political parties in the 
Government of National Unity and in Parliament, and by all sectors of our 
society.  It is rare for a new government to have a coherent vision.  It is 
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even more unusual for that vision to be supported by a national 
consensus.145   
Although the efficacy of the RDP remains to be proven, agreement on the RDP 
represents a considerable achievement for all sectors of South African society.  The 
contrast of this achievement with the negotiated reform of El Salvador is significant.  The 
absence of civil society involvement in El Salvador’s internal security reform negotiation 
indicates the level of distrust that leftist opposition groups felt towards all levels of 
government and the public who supported them.  The FMLN likely felt that the 
impending election with the odds favoring the ARENA party would not allow 
concessions favoring their demands.  As a result, the FMLN wanted the peace accords to 
contain all the major agreed upon reforms, rather than waiting for civil society input and 
support after the election.  In South Africa, the fact that the ANC won the election 
allowed for more participation from all sectors of society. 
d. Police Transformation 
The reforms in the police and criminal justice system concentrated on 
changes in control, structure, organizational culture, and composition.  The defense force 
was generally seen as technically strong and efficient in comparison to the inefficient, 
badly trained, ill equipped, and poorly led police.  The main reason for this was years of 
institutional neglect.  The police were looked upon as the poor cousin of the SADF and a 
dumping ground for whites who could not find employment elsewhere.  The SADF had 
never felt threatened by the police in contrast to the situation in El Salvador.  The large 
number of transfers between the SADF and the SAP and vice versa also indicated the 
pleasant nature of their relationship.  Additionally, the SAP was a product of institutional 
isolation.  The SAP was a “closed” organization during apartheid, whereas the SADF 
managed to keep up with modern advancements in both technology and tactics.  As such, 
the relationship between th  military and the police did not present any roadblocks to 
reform as did in El Salvador.  The SANDF did not feel threatened by the police reform 
measures. 
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Once negotiations got underway, the SAP (to a greater degree than the 
SADF) found there was intense community pressure to change and reassess its role and 
methods.  One of the ANC’s strongest demands prior to transition was related to 
improvements in policing and the lifting of restrictive laws.  The requirement for open 
political activity, essential to  successful democratic transition, put enormous pressure 
on the SAP to reassess its roles particularly in facilitating mass protests.  The SAP, unlike 
the SADF, faced demands from communities at the local level for change.  It also faced 
internal pressure for change from the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU), 
which had formed in 1989, well before the transition.  POPCRU argued for both the 
human rights of police and those of the public.  In short, democratization of the police 
force was nec ssary if it was to function as a community service.146   
The process of changing from a police force to a police service began with 
the 1995 appointment of a civilian National Police Commissioner as head of the SAPS.  
Before the 1994 elections, a significant amount of research on policing the post-apartheid 
South African society was accomplished by universities, non-gov rnme tal organizations 
(NGOs), political parties, and the SAP.  The result was that South Africa should develop 
a “community policing” style imilar to those found in developed democracies.  Although 
these facts might lead one to expect rapid change, the process, in contrast to El 
Salvador’s, was incremental by design.  One reason which accounts for the incremental 
nature of reform efforts is hat the oppositional group attained the majority power within 
the government.  In contrast to ARENA’s power-base in El Salvador, South Africa’s new 
government was dominated by the ANC party and thus felt that their demands would be 
met.  Even though a lot of research went into the determining of the reform path, the 
implementation of the reform efforts could move along slowly incorporating changes as 
the need occurred. 
The police reform process in South Africa was managed in three distinct 
but overlapping phases: 
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· Phase 1 – Rationalization:  to ensure effective administration at 
national and provincial levels of government as prescribed by the 
Constitution. 
· Phase 2 – Amalgamation:  the physical amalgamation of the various 
existing policing agencies into one national police service. 
· Phase 3 – Change:  the transformation of SAPS into a “professional, 
representative, efficient and effective, impartial, transparent and 
accountable service” which “upholds and protects the fundamental 
rights of all people, and which carries out its mission in consultation 
and cooperation with the needs of the community.”147 
Phase 1 and 2 (rationalization and amalgamation) were legislated in the 
new South African Police Services Act (4 October 1995), which provides for the 
establishment, organization, regulation, and control of the South African Police Service 
with a single budget and command structure.  Community policing was also legislated in 
the Constitution for the implementation of Phase 3 (change). 
e. National Crime Prevention Strategy 
The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) was adopted by the 
cabinet in May 1996 as an “overarching vehicle for police reform.”  The NCPS, a wide-
ranging 88-page document in small single space type, was intended to address the lack of 
coordination and interdepartmental linkages in the fight against crime through a 
“comprehensive multi-agency approach to crime prevention.”148  The NCPS has the 
following three main objectives: 
· Coordination and integration of criminal justice functions through an 
Integrated Justice System (IJS), designed to improve the management and 
processing of criminal cases; 
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· Improved coordination and leadership among the pertinent departments with 
the goal of addressing high priority crime areas; 
· Encouragement of research and implementation of crime prevention 
programs.149 
The NCPS suggests a more unified approach to the problems of policing 
and criminal justice.  It aims to draw together role players in government to provide a 
basis for restructuring the criminal justice system, and in the end, provide more effective 
crime prevention programs.  Nevertheless, the greatest strength of the crime prevention 
strategy, its inclusive and comprehensive nature, also holds the potential to be its greatest 
weakness.  The very complexity and wide-ranging nature of the strategy suggests that 
coordination and leadership are critical success factors.150 
A problem with the NCPS policy is its lofty ideals from the perspective of 
normative democratic police reform and effective law enforcement practices are far from 
addressing the basic needs of policing.  The focus is on “crime prevention” rather than 
specific strategies for policing, such as “community policing.”151   
Another area of concern lies in the nature of the policy formulation itself, 
which has been assigned to consultants and specialists outside the departments.  With 
little experience and understanding of bureaucratic processes, these “experts” often 
suggest policies that are not realistic and often lie outside the realm of what is achievable.  
This is exemplified in the policy development during 1996.  New appointments were 
made to policy-making posts within the National Secretariat for Safety and Security using 
selection criteria that had more to do with incumbents’ strategic managerial skills, r ther 
than their knowledge and experience in policing.  While the new policies accepted by the 
Department of Safety and Security have been visionary and creative, they have failed to 
address issues in sufficient detail to provide clear guidelines for actio .  Mark Malan 
succinctly sums up the problem with the NCPS policy document, “Like many ‘expert’ 
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treatises on transformation in South Africa, however, the document is long on analysis, 
but very short on practical solutions.”152 
2. Professionalization of Internal Security Forces 
 South Africa’s reform efforts entailed using existing structures and institutions 
and “adapting” them to new styles of policing.  In contrast with El Salvador, South Africa 
amalgamated its eleven police forces into one new police service.  South Africa did not 
incorporate any former combatants into their police service as El Salvador’s negotiated 
settlement mandated, and the previous governmental institutions were already familiar 
with democratic ideals and governance.  South Africa adopted  “community policing” 
style with encouragement from international actors and revised the curriculums of 
existing police colleges to reflect the new doctrine.  The strength of South Africa’s 
incremental approach to the transformation process is that each tep of the process is 
debated, agreed upon, and built upon the unfolding implementation process.  Each step, 
whether a success or not, has led to more policy formulation to combat problems 
encountered along the way.         
a. Community Policing 
Despite major investments in the NCPS, crime rates in South Africa 
continued to rise.  Public outcry over the safety and security of citizens, together with the 
upcoming election year spurred the government to shift its emphasis to search for policies 
that lead to more effective combating of crime.  In April 1997, the Department of Safety 
and Security published its formal policy on community policing, the Community Policing 
Policy Framework and Guidelines.  Developed through a consultative process over a 
thre-year period, this framework defined community policing in terms of collaborative, 
partnership-based approach to local level problem solving and articulated the 
transformation towards an effective, and accountable police force.  In addition to the 
internal debating and collaborative approach, “community policing” was the prevailing 
buzzword in the international policing debate, and very much influenced the underlying 
police transformation process initiated by the South African government.   
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The Policy Framework was the first explicit expression of community 
policing as a methodology for reducing crime by improving the professional quality of 
service provided by the police.  Written retroactively in response to developments since 
the creation of the new South African Police Service, the policy document was intended 
for providing direction for police managers.  The five core elements of community 
policing as outlined in the Policy Framework are as follows:
· Service orientation:  The provision of a professional policing service, 
responsive and accountable to the needs of the community; 
· Partnership:  The creation of a co-operative and consultative process for 
problem-solving; 
· Problem-solving:  The joint identification and analysis of the causes of crime 
and the dev lopment of creative measures to address them; 
· Empowerment:  The establishment of joint responsibility and capacity for 
addressing crime; 
· Accountability:  The establishment of a culture of accountability to address 
the needs and concerns of the community.153  
A vehicle for implementing community policing and improving the 
relationship between the police and the community was the establishment of Community 
Police Forums (CPFs).  By September 1997, approximately 1,200 community police 
forums (CPFs) and sub-forums were set up at 1,221 police stations.  These forums were 
supposed to bring the police and community closer together.  However, the fact that 
members of the notorious Security Branch were initially used to introduce community 
policing has not surprisingly put a damper on community accolades.  The philosophy of 
the democratic policing and understanding of the delicate relationship between the police 
and the community had not been explained to police personnel in necessary detail.  As a 
result, there were strong feelings that community policing had concentrated to heavily on 
the creation of CPF structures and gaining legitimacy for the SAPS, rather than on 
improving the outcomes of policing in terms of better detection and crime reduction.  
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Rather than viewng CPFs as a vital link between the community and police 
accountability, evidence suggests that communities have seen CPFs as a mechanism to 
control and direct the police.  The main disconnect seems to be that both the communities 
and the SAPS have failed to grasp that community policing is more that just establishing 
Community Forums.154  
b. Police Composition and Training 
An important and difficult part of South African police reform efforts was 
to break the mold of militaristic and authoritarian policing d to effect changes in the 
nature and culture of the new police service.  Steps were taken to professionalize and 
civilianize the South African Police Service management by replacing up to 13,000 
uniformed personnel engaged in administrative jobs with trained c vilian administrators.  
After the elections in April 1994, 26,000 black police from the Bantustan or homeland 
police forces, many of whom were officers including twenty generals, were incorporated 
into the SAPS.  In contrast to the integration process of the SANDF, the SAPS did not 
receive an influx of MK personnel, although a few members of the ANC’s security and 
intelligence structures were incorporated.  By 1995, the SAPS was thirty-five percen  
white, fifty-four percent African, eight percent colored and three percent Asian.155  
Women constituted nineteen percent of the service.   
In addition to changes in police force composition, external management 
expertise was sought, as police officers and advisors from a number of European and 
Commonwealth countries were brought in to oversee changes and advise on training and 
management issues.  Improvements were made to training procedures, but progress 
remains slow. 156 
During apartheid, SAP training, carried out mainly at three training 
colleges (and four axiliary schools in the black homelands) was concentrated toward 
military-style drilling.  Basic training was followed by a counterinsurgency course at one 
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of the SADF’s specialized bases, further emphasizing the military nature of apartheid 
training.  Many researchers have pointed out that policing should be a discretionary 
activity requiring a detailed knowledge of the law as well as negotiation skills and an 
ability to assess the best course of action.  Training colleges, strictly segregated by race 
until 1991, were gradually integrated and the emphasis on military and drilling skills in 
the course curriculum was reduced.157  
The new White Paper on Safety and Security adopted in September 1998 
pays significant attention to the major focus areas of law enforcement i  a democracy.  
Specifically, these are:  improved criminal investigations, active visible policing, and 
service to victims.  Criminal investigations are to be improved by a number of specific 
interventions, such as increasing the number of detectives relative to the caseload and 
better detective training programs.158  However, despite the considerable potential of 
training and retraining courses as transformation vehicles, very little has been 
accomplished in this area, except for still more debate, investigation and reporting on 
what should be done.  For example, a comprehensive review and report on improved 
basic training for the integrated police services resulted in only one inflow of new recruits 
for training in 1995.  Immediately following this i take, there was a three-year lull in 
recruitment and basic police training.  There are also questions as to the viability of the 
new Basic Level Training plan and about the omission of continued training initiatives 
once recruits are incorporated into the police ranks.  While there seems to be extensive 
international financial support, as indicated in the next section, the efficient use of those 
funds is questionable because of coordination and management problems between 
departments.159 
c. International Assistance 
Although not as extensive as in El Salvador, foreign donor assistance 
packages have provided developmental assistance in all areas of South African 
democratization.  While some international actors have made conscientious efforts to 
spread their assistance across all core departments, others have had preferences for 
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specific departments.  Significant assistance has been given in areas to help in the 
professionalization of security forces.  For example, Belgium has provided assistance 
amounting to $3.5 million for a five-y ar project supporting the development of 
community policing, public-order policing, and combating organized crime.  Denmark 
has given financial support of about $170,000 to “train the trainers” programs at the 
SAPS colleges and provided $500,000 to support a “Policing Project” at the University of 
Witwatersrand’s Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.  Sweden has made 
a large investment in Human Rights and Democracy Training for the SAPS, spending 
approximately $317,000 on workshops and training materials from 1995-1998.160 
The United Kingdom has also focused its assistance on police training and 
support for community policing.  A UK and Commonwealth Advisory Team helped 
develop a new basic level training program (BLTP) during 1995.  From 1995-1 98, UK 
financial assistance amounted to $9.4 million to support community police projects in 
four of the provinces.  Other significant donors of police reform in South Africa include 
Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States.  Intergovernmental 
groups from the European Union and the United Nations have also actively supported 
police reform efforts.161   
International assistance should continue to specifically target the training 
and education of present and future members of the SAPS in both detective work and in 
basic law enforcement skills using international policing standards.  It is at the level of 
basic skills training and fundamental continuing education that the greatest opportunities 
exist for making fundamental changes in police culture. 
3. Establishment of Mechanisms of Accountability  
Accountability mechanisms in South Africa’s internal security forces include both 
external and internal control measures.  First, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) was inaugurated to delve into the past and find out the truth behind the veil of 
apartheid secrecy.  Second, upon recommendation from the TRC report, an Independent 
Complaints Directorate was formed on 1 April 1997 to promote proper police conduct 
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and to prevent future human rights abuses.  Third, in 2001, the National Evaluation 
Services Division was established as an internal auditing arm of the SAPS. 
a. Truth and Reconciliation Commission – Unveiling the Truth 
The death toll attributed to the apartheid era differs greatly from source to 
source; actual numbers are often omitted, probably because they are not even attainable.  
Some estimate that over 1.5 million people died during the years between 1948 and 1994, 
associated with the apartheid struggle, while others claim only what they can document, 
some 300,000 deaths.  The reason for this wide range in numbers is the veil of secrecy 
that was designed to obscure the truth of South Africa’s apartheid.  In 1995, Nelson 
Mandela, in a concerted effort to get o th  ruth, appointed Archbishop Desmond Tutu as 
Chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  The TRC’s objectives were 
“to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which 
transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past.”162  Over the course of two and one-
half years, the TRC interviewed all those who would come forward to tell their stories 
about the truth of apartheid’s policies.  In all, 21,000 victims came forward to testify 
about their own ordeals or about the plight of others.  About 10,000 perpetrators came 
forward to seek amnesty.  The results were compiled in a five volume, 3,500 page 
document, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, presented to Nelson 
Mandela in 1998.163 
Apartheid practices embodied the systematic elimination of thousands of 
voices, which should have been part of the nation’s memory.  Perhaps all governments, to 
a greater or lesser extent, uncomfortable with the notion of transparency, prefer to operate 
beyond the glare of public scrutiny.  However, in apartheid South Africa, government 
secrecy was a way of life.  The elimination of memory took place through censorship, 
confiscation of materials, bannings, incarceration, assassination and a wide range of 
related actions.  The fundament l guideline governing public access to and destruction of 
state records was provided in the 1962 Archives Act. However, selective destruction of 
state records beyond the parameters of the Archives Act was pervasive within the 
security establishment in the period 1960 to 1990.  This reflected apartheid’s tendency to 
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operate in a highly secretive manner and the fact that sensitive records were not subject to 
the operation of the Archives Act.  Between 1990 and 1994, selective destruction became 
a systematic endeavor authorized by the Cabinet and reaching into all sectors of the state.  
It is clear that the former apartheid regime meant to prevent the new government from 
access to many incriminating and sensitive documents.  Those responsible continued to 
maintain that their motive was simply to protect intelligence sources and the legitimate 
security interests of the state.  The evidence demonstrates that the destruction went far 
beyond this.  Those responsible maintain that the effort was entirely legal. They argu  
that ‘state sensitive’ records fell outside the definition of records, which were subject to 
the Archives Act.164   
Because of their findings, the TRC acknowledged that the picture it gained 
of the apartheid truth was far from complete.  It had searched through reams of 
government records, launched investigations into secret burial grounds, exhumed bodies 
of victims, and examined activities of all the organizations involved on all sides of the 
conflict.  Businessmen, churchmen, lawyers, doctors, the media, and people from all 
walks of life were interviewed.  Nevertheless, the systematic erasure of popular memory 
had taken its toll.  Much more remained buried than had been exhumed.165  However, the 
sheer magnitude of the TRC’s investigation and reconciliation attempt exemplifies the 
government’s political will to provide transparency and a collective memory.  In order to 
gain legitimacy in the future, it was believed that acknowledgement of the past was 
needed so that the new democratic state could move frward. 
b. Independent Complaints Directorate 
Section 208 of the Constitution, which states that a civilian secretariat for 
the police service must be established under the responsible minister, provides the vision 
of democratic civilian control over the police.  Theoretically, this should protect the 
police from inappropriate interference and control by any one political party.  
Accountability was further enhanced by the creation of an Independent Complaints 
Directorate (ICD) under chapter ten of the Police Act.  With substantive investigative 
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powers, the ICD began operating in April 1997, and is considered a crucial tool for 
civilian control over the South African Police Service (SAPS).  It has its own budget and 
offices, and should prove effective in deterr g th  abuse of police powers.   
So far, the ICD has received over 8,000 complaints of alleged police 
misconduct in the past four years of its existence.  A biannual report is sent to the 
Minister of Safety and Security on the status of impending investigations.  The pertinent 
areas of the Police Act and TRC report authorizing the powers of the ICD can be viewed 
on the ICD website.  The complaints process is also explained in detail with an online 
registration form for lodging complaints.  The biannual reports on the status of impending 
investigations can also be viewed from the website, as well as, the results of closed 
cases.166  The results of these reports and the transparency/accessibility of the complaints 
process seem to indicate that the SAPS has well-functioning mechanisms of 
accountability.  However, it is still too early to give a complete evaluation of the 
complaints process. 
c. National Evaluation Services 
In April 2001, the National Evaluation Services (NES) was created within 
the SAPS as a division with four main functions: (1) service delivery evaluations; (2) 
service investigations; (3) occupational health & safety; and (4) internal auditing. 
  This division is regarded as a support function division of the SAPS 
specifically responsible for supporting management in the assessment of service delivery 
standards and performance relating to service delivery.  The division is also required to 
evaluate compliance to Occupational Health and Safety standards.  The internal auditing 
capacity of the SAPS reports under this division for administration purposes.  The 
division is also responsible for national standards and policy relating to evaluation of 
community service in the SAPS.  Although there are evaluation services components on 
area and provincial leve s reporting operationally to the area commissioner and provincial 
commissioner respectively, such components function in accordance with national 
policies and guidelines issued by this division.  The division has a national capacity for 
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national level valuations and interventions.  The division is accountable to a National 
Steering Committee on Service Delivery.167  
C. CONCLUSION – TRANSITION, NEGOTIATION, AND REFORM 
El Salvador and South Africa’s negotiated war transitions provided the necessary 
opening to affect major demilitarizing internal security reforms.  The degree and nature 
of their respective reform efforts was dependent on the interests and balance of power of 
the key actors affected by the reforms.  In each case, different actors had the dominant
power role and their interests affected the different approaches to internal security 
reform.  In El Salvador, the ARENA party retained the power, and the FMLN negotiated 
from a disadvantaged position.  This encouraged an agreement consisting of a “shock 
treatment” approach to internal security reform.  Conversely, in South Africa, where the 
ANC negotiated from an advantage of power and support, the resulting approach to 
internal security reform was more relaxed, incremental, and gradual.  The war transitions 
of each country opened “windows of opportunity,” allowing the international community 
to affect the negotiations, and the ensuing internal security reforms.  Surprisingly, both 
approaches, although very different (radical vs gradual) together with the differen  
balances of power (rightist government vs opposition) produced similar outcomes – 
middle of the road reform measures.  This can best be explained by the overwhelming 
obstacle to the consolidation of police reform posed by the conditions of post-conflict 
societies, the subject of the following chapter. 
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IV. CHALLENGES TO CO NSOLIDATION OF POLIC E REFORM  
Although the resolution of armed conflict often provides an opening for police 
reform during democratic transitions, it also creates serious obstacles to reform 
consolidation.  This chapter argues that many of the challenges faced by El Salvador and 
South Africa were the result of post-conflict conditions.  There are five challenges in this 
category.  The first challenge involves the existence of a tra siti nal security vacuum 
resulting from demobilization of combatants and increased weapons throughout society.  
Largely related to this vacuum is the second challenge, which involves the increased level 
of crime that is pervasive in post-conflict societis.  The third challenge also related to the 
crime problems of post-c nflict societies is the creation of parallel police forces that 
undermine the police force’s ability to develop their in-hous  capabilities.  The fourth 
challenge involves the timely creation of mechanisms of accountability to ensure that past 
habitual practices of abuse are not repeated.  The fifth challenge of post-conflict societies 
involves the implementation of simultaneous judicial reform.  The increase in violence 
and crime associated with post-conflict societies makes the processes of applying justice 
to criminals also important.  Continuance of corrupt and inefficient processes for 
prosecuting criminals can undermine the successes of police reform.      
This chapter also describes the role of international actors in implementing and 
consolidating police reform efforts.  International actors are more likely to have the 
opportunity to affect police reform during negotiations of peace accords.  However, their 
actual level of influence depends on the level of domestic support and the ability of 
international actors to sustain commitment to the reforms over time.  Two main 
challenges are discussed.  First is the issue of funding.  Reluctance in providing promised 
funds for whatever reasons aggravates the crime surge characterizing post-co flict 
societies.  Ambiguities and issues regarding specific strategies on how the money will be 
spent should be clearly worked out during the negotiation process in order to keep 
implementation on track.  Lack of strategy and hesitation in this area can quickly derail 
efforts.  The second international challenge involves the competing interests of 
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international actors, which can undermine reform efforts especially when significant aid 
was given during the conflict era.     
The experiences of El Salvador and South Africa suggest that there are no clear-
cut methods of successfully reforming militarized police forces.  Surprisingly, although 
each country exhibited different levels of support among various actors, and different 
approaches (“shock treatment” vs gradual) the outcome of their efforts was surprisingly 
similar – middle of the road reforms.  Although both countries had internal conflicts 
resulting in militarized police forces, South Africa seemed in a much better position to 
face the challenges of consolidation.  First, South Africa’s military did not pose any 
opposition to police reform, whereas in El Salvador the legacy of the military’s control 
over the police meant military reluctance to reform.  Sec nd, the results of the 
foundational elections in South Africa gave the advantage to the opposition, while in El 
Salvador, the continuance of the rightist ARENA government meant less domestic 
political support for reform.  Third, greater domestic support in South Africa meant that 
the international community had a greater ability to influence the implementation of 
reform.  However, the outcome of reform efforts in both countries was surprisingly 
similar.  This can best be explained by the overwhelming obstacle to the consolidation of 
police reform posed by the conditions of post-conflict societies. 
A. THE CHALLENGE OF POST-CONFLICT SOCIET IES  
The challenges emerging from post-conflict conditions cannot be underestimated 
as serious inhibitors to consolidation.  Post-conflict societies have experienced years of 
violence and repression that create four challenges: the emergence of a transitional 
security vacuum, crime surges, the emergence of parallel police forces, and the slow 
development of mechanisms of accountability.  The following sections address those 
challenges.     
1. Transitional “Security Vacuum” 
Where conflict ends in negotiations, as in the cases of El Salvador and South 
Africa, a vacuum in the availability of security to civil society often resul s.  The forces 
providing security in the past are often disbanded, discredited, or are in a state of 
disorganization.  Peace agreements often restrict existing military forces to the barracks, 
79 
as in El Salvador.  In other cases, such as South Africa, where ncremental change has 
allowed continued military involvement in internal security, lack of needed resources, 
especially in many rural areas has contributed to the “vacuum.”  Additionally, fledgling 
democracies are generally unprepared to deploy a well-trained po ice force throughout 
the state immediately following a cease-fire, or peace agreement.  Indeed, this lack of 
preparation has become the primary focus in dealing with “public security gaps” 
identified in recent United Nations peacekeeping operatio s.168  As a result, political 
leaders are tempted to keep the military involved in internal security.  This has occurred 
in South Africa’s police reform efforts.  
Conflicts ending in negotiations frequently require a marked degree of 
demobilization of government and insurgent combatants.  Demobilization occurs for 
political reasons, as well as financial reasons.  Politically, transitioning regimes have an 
interest in implementing much needed internal security reforms including the 
demobilization of insurgent groups.  Economically, surplus soldiers are costly, and the 
expansion of governmental troops due to internal conflict is no longer necessary.  Still, 
demobilizing significant number of former combatants carries considerable risks for 
public security.  Disgruntled and demobilized troops, trained in the use of firearms and 
organized in tightly knit groups can be easily lured into criminal networks.  Criminal 
activities can be attractive alternatives for former combatants facing shrinking job 
markets and increases in unemployment as a direct result of demobilization.   
In South Africa, the downsizing or “rightsizing” of the swollen numbers in 
military personnel following integration is still ongoing in South Africa today, as the 
military faces reducing its numbers by another 15,000.  The fears of demobilizing large 
numbers of combatants who face impending unemployment has prompted South Africa 
to invigorate the vocational training available through the Service Corps, a transitional 
unit where ex-military can go to school for one year and prepare to enter the civilian job 
market.  Although this program for helping in the transition phase to civilian life is quite 
welcome for ex-soldiers, the reality is that current high unemployment rates make the 
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possibilities of finding civilian employment very difficult, with or without vocational 
training. 
An important by-product of demobilization is the surplus of conventional arms 
and the availability of more powerful weapons throughout society.  Demobilized soldiers 
often take their weapons home or sell them on the black market.  Demobilization 
necessarily requires extremely aggressive and thorough disarmament methods.  If these 
methods are not seriously undertaken, the surplus of arms is apt to find its way to 
organized crime sectors. 
2. Crime Surges – Role of the Military in Internal Security 
An inevitable side effect of the transitional security vacuum is the surge of crime, 
which can spike to unprecedented levels following transition from authoritarian rule.  
While rises in crime are common to most democratic transitions, the conditions of 
conflict termination heighten the crime problem.  The reduction of public security 
personnel due to demobilization upon conflict termination adds to the problem.  In El 
Salvador, the military and private sector expressed concerns that the number of public 
personnel would be too few to handle the crime surge.  This may have contributed to the 
government’s position on delaying the demobilization of the National Police (NP).169  
Government resistance to the dissolution of the NP also reflects their trust in the old 
security forces.  Additionally, in many rural areas, there was significant support for the 
National Guard, whose presence had comprised the only public security for these 
communities for the past decades.   
Because of the crime problem, within two months of the ceasefire, El Salvador’s 
government converted two security forces into border patrol and internal military police 
units of the army rather than dissolve them as agreed to in the accords.170  In 1993, the 
Salvadoran government, without formally informing the legislature, began deploying 
military units in quasi-public security roles to patrol highways and assist in the protection 
of the coffee harvest.  Although these measures enjoyed popular support, they were in 
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direct violation of the accords and the constitution and were viewed by the FMLN and 
their supporters as potentially threatening.  Concerns were raised about the potential 
remilitarization of internal security.  Additionally, in March 1995, the government 
initiated Plan Guardian, creating military and civilian police joint commands to conduct 
patrols in particularly violent public order situations in the rural areas of El Salvador.  
The UN has repeatedly questioned these measur s stating that there should be a definite 
demarcation between the military’s external defense and civilian police’s internal security 
responsibilities.  Yet, public outcry about the crime situation continually results in 
governmental measures that could p tentially undermine the extent of reform and 
institutional consolidation of the PNC.171 
In South Africa, the decision to keep the internal role of the SANDF was a direct 
result of the high levels of crime both before and especially after transition to democracy.  
This has been a particularly controversial and sensitive issue.  The conventional view is 
that parliament would not seek the mission of internal order if it were not for the high 
levels of crime and violence and the widespread proliferation of w apons in private 
hands.  Public outcry about the growing crime problem has resulted in calls for further 
military involvement.172  However, clearly established rules of engagement, security 
chains of command, and agreement on the committed duration of the SANDF must be 
addressed in order to prevent the misuse of the armed forces in public security roles.  
Finally, the years of violence in society due to internal conflict has conditioned 
citizens to believe that violence and counter-vi le ce are the only solutions to solving 
social problems.  In both El Salvador and South Africa, citizens became accustomed to 
violence, killing, assassinations, bombings, abuses and corruption, all of which eroded 
the moral fiber of society and created severe psychological sufferin .  Once peace was 
achieved, this social conditioning to violence paved the way for the development of 
delinquency and crime. 
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3. Parallel Police Units 
Largely related to the crime problem in post-conflict transitions, a serious 
problem, which developd in El Salvador, was the formation of “parallel” units 
duplicating specialized divisions of the newly reformed police.  In El Salvador, Public 
Security Minister Hugo Barrera formed an anti-kidn pping unit, which duplicated the 
PNC’s Criminal Investigations Division, however, it was funded privately by 
businessmen and headed by a Venezuelan citizen.173 Part of the impetus for this unit was 
the lack of experience in the new police forces and the need for prompt and effective 
response to increased crime.  While the importance of effective responses to increased 
crime is apparent, this choice for expediency undermines the legitimacy of the new force 
and the development of its own in-house capabilities. 
In South Africa a similar problem with roots dating back to the “Total Strategy” 
era was the development of vigilante groups and private security companies.  Due to the 
huge increase in crime stemming from the transition to democracy, an associated increase 
in vigilantism was seen, especially in the rural areas where policing was minimal.  In the 
wealthy and mostly white areas, private security companies were the vogue, and continue 
to be to this day.  Although many see this rise as helping in controlling crime and keeping 
neighborhoods safe, their existence, along with the continued use of the military in 
internal security roles is inhibiting the growth and effectiveness of the SAPS.  In recent 
years, a number of individual private security firms have approached the SAPS with 
requests for the formation of partnerships on an ad hoc basis.  While these offers seem 
tempting, however, the fact that there are currently no fixed policy guidelines on how 
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4. Mechanisms of Accountability 
Oversight units should be developed and deployed simultaneously with the new 
operational police forces in order to prevent the development of bad habits and to instill 
an expectation of accountability among the police and civil society.  Equally important 
are external mechanisms of accountability, such as the media, non-gov rnme tal 
organizations (NGOs), legislative oversight, and the establishment of civilian courts’ 
authority over police abuse cases.  However, when the deployment of oversight units is 
slow, the potential for human rights abuses increases. 
In South Africa and El Salvador, the deployment of oversight offices was 
extremely slow.  In El Salvador, the Disciplinary and Control Units lagged behind the 
deployment of the PNC by one year.  Additionally, the Inspector General for the PNC 
was not appointed until October 1995, over three years after the signing of the peace 
accords.  On a similar note, South African police reform efforts did not establish the 
Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) until 1997, two years after the creation of the 
South African Police Service (SAPS).  It is critical when reforming corrupt and abusive 
forces that an oversight and accountability system exists to watch over the progression of 
reforms.  Without oversight, the temptation to maintain the previous “status quo” is too 
great, and opens the door to increased societal distrust of the democratic reforms of the 
new government. 
The report card on the human rights performance of the PNC and the SAPS 
remains far superior to that of the old security forces.  Cases of homicide and torture by 
PNC and SAPS officers have become the exception rather than the rule.  Former National 
Police officers now in the PNC have reported that under the new police, abuses are often 
reported by fellow PNC officers.  This would have been unheard of in the old regime.175   
Transition to civilian policing, however, does not necessarily mean a transition to 
an accountable police force.  In 1995, the popular perception was that the PNC’s human 
rights record was getting worse.  Citizen comments comparing the PNC to the old PN 
became commonplace.  This may have been in part due to the excessive use of force in 
1995 in responding to public demonstrations, labor strikes, and protests.  Two eople 
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were killed in such protests, and police officials agree that in some cases excessive force 
was used.  These incidents have marred the public image of the PNC in terms of human 
rights.  Moreover, slow development of institutions of accountability have f c ated the 
rise in PNC abuses.  The lack of a working Office for Internal Affairs and Discipline 
during the first year of the PNC’s existence contributed to lax standards of conduct 
during the developmental months of the new force.176  
Similarly in South Africa, highly publicized incidents of police indiscretions, 
ranging from lack of good judgment to death of citizens while in police custody have 
tainted the public’s perception of the SAPS.  It does not help that soaring crime rates 
have been difficult to control and contributed to a view that the SAPS is not able to 
handle security problems.  However, overall, the incidents of human rights abuses and 
indiscretions are much lower than during the apartheid era, when torture and execution 
were commonplace.  
Social conditioning also contributed to challenges in the area of impunity.  
Mechanisms of accountability were non-existe t under the authoritarian regimes of El 
Salvador and South Africa, and “excess of authority” was rewarded.  Because virtually 
no military or police officers were ever prosecuted for human rights abuses during El 
Salvador’s civil war and South Africa’s apartheid, the idea of making complaints and 
accountability to civil society was foreign to citizens.  These factors created a degree of 
social conditioning to violence and impunity, which impeded (especially in rural areas) 
civil society’s ability to adjust and make meaningful contributions to the new security 
systems. 
5. Absence of Simultaneous Judicial Reform 
El Salvador’s judicial reforms were not only far less specific than police and 
military reforms, but were largely ignored until the last minute during negotiations.  
Consequently, the enactment of judicial reforms such as purging the bench, depoliticizing 
the Supreme Court, and streamlining procedures and laws were slow and incomplete.  
National Civilian Police (PNC) agents were frustrated with problems at the judiciary 
level that frequently resulted in the release of suspects.  Additionally, new police agents 
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made many procedural errors and their inexperience contributed to these outcomes.  
Nevertheless, police reform must focus increased attention to the judicial reforms to 
prevent corrupt practices that were the legacies of the previous authoritarian regime.   
In South Africa, judicial system reforms are a monumental problem and viewed 
by many as in a state of crisis.  Reform efforts after 1994 concentrated almost exclusively 
on the most visible component of policing.  Community policing has been the 
“buzzword” of reform efforts designed to sell the acceptability of the new SAPS to the 
majority of the South African public.  However, the transformation within the criminal 
justice system is far from complete.  The most serious problems are in the areas of crime 
detection, prosecution of offenders, and the prison system.   
In the area of prosecution, the problem boils down to the inexperience of public 
prosecutors and the poorly managed magistrates courts.  Constant postponements 
frustrate witnesses.  Often they fail to appear in court when the cases are finally heard.  
Additionally the coordination between justice and police officials is lacking.  Often 
prosecutors and investigating officers meet for the first time at the trail.  Evidence seems 
to indicate that the problem lies with the lack of skill in middle management.177  
Finally, South African prisons are in dire need of reform.  Ironically, during 
apartheid, when as many as four out of every one thousand citizens were jailed, the 
prisons were better managed and staffed.  However, staffing shortages and increasing 
corruption are bringing prisons to the brink of crisis.  A large part of the problem lies in 
the rigidity of the penal system.  Alternative forms of sentencing are unavailable.  
Furthermore, the Department of Correctional Services determines parole, inviting bribery 
as an easy mechanism to relieve pressure on the prison system.  Corruption throughout 
the justice system seems to be pervasive.  The challenge awaiting policy makers in this 
area will likely be one of the most significant in the next few years.178    
B. THE CHALLENGE OF INTERNATIONAL ASSIST ANCE 
War transitions provide an opening for international actors to affect major police 
reforms.  Negotiations of peace treaties provide a tremendous opportunity for 
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international actors to affect police reform efforts.  In both El Salvador and South Africa, 
the United Nations played a central role in mediating and negotiating peace accords 
between bitter parties, and their influence is apparent in the content of the accords.  El 
Salvador’s police reform efforts were stipulated in great detail within their peace accords, 
whereas in South Africa, the peace accords were not nearly as specific.  Instead, after 
peace was achieved, police reform efforts were more debated and negotiatinter ally, 
from within the state.  The difference in the approaches, as earlier argued is attributed to 
the balance of power among the actors most affected by the reform.  However, the type of 
approach also affected the level of international influence in ormulating reform 
measures.  Because the details of El Salvador’s police reform were stipulated in the 
accords, the international community’s influence was higher.  In South Africa, 
international influence was less because reform measures were debated aft  peace was 
achieved.  
Although international actors are more likely to have the opportunity to affect 
police reform during negotiations of peace, their actual level of influence during 
implementation depends on the level of domestic support and the ability of international 
actors to sustain commitment to those reforms over time.  The level of influence can be 
analyzed by examining the challenges of aiding post-co flict countries in their quest at 
reforming corrupt and abusive police forces.  The first challenge was the process 
involved in providing funding for police reform efforts.  In March 1992, the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and nineteen 
countries pledged an unprecedented $800 million to support the reform process in El 
Salvador.  However, by August 1992, no donors had provided funds except for the 
United States and Norway.  International support was lacking partly due to the perception 
that the Salvadoran government and military were not committed to the reforms.  
International support was also lacking because donors viewed crises in other parts of the 
world as more serious and believed the U.S. had a primary interest in El Salvador 
because of its long involvement there.179  Furthermore, internatio l support for public 
security aspects of the peace process was much lower than for other areas, such as land 
transfers.  One reason for this international reluctance stemmed from negative past 
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experiences with police aid that fed corruption rather than eforming police forces.180  
International reluctance to commit resources and personnel can aggravate the crime surge 
that follows war transitions.  The importance of providing adequate funding for internal 
security reforms cannot be overemphasized in that it affects all citizens and has a major 
impact on the political environment of the country.   
Additionally, the high cost of the PNC project was attributed to creating a 
completely new force to overcome the problems of earlier corruption.  Yet, international 
donors were initially leery.  International donors incorrectly perceived that savings in 
Salvadoran military budgetary cuts would be able to fulfill most of the funding 
requirements.  International perception was that domestic political support was lacking 
and that this lack of support was responsible for El Salvador’s inablilty to fund its own 
police reform efforts.  However, in reality, there was little room for savings in any 
spending categories because of the urgent postwar need to increase spending in health, 
education, and poverty alleviation.181  Thus, international influence depends not only on 
the actual level of domestic support, but also on the perceived level of domestic support 
for police reform.    
International competing interests can also affect internal security reform efforts.  
One example is with the U.S. support and interest in preserving the Executive Anti-
Narcotics Unit (UEA) and the naming of Captain Peña Durán (former Chief of the UEA) 
for the post of Deputy Director of the PNC thereby endangering the conduct of the new 
police force.  U.S. financial investment during the Cold War and close advisory ties to the 
UEA, led the U.S. government to cling to this unit and their members during the 
transition to democracy.  Evidence suggests that U.S. officials believed Peña Durán to be 
“clean” and willing to affect reform within the PNC.  In the end, because of increased 
publicity of Peña Durán’s gross violations of the accords and continued UN criticism, the 
U.S. finally changed its position.  U.S. reluctance to demobilize the corrupt UEA and 
oust Peña Durán from the PNC reflects the “parochial affinity” toward units that were 
supported during the Cold War.182  This undermined the process of purging bad elements 
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from the new security forces.  As a result, even as international actors were central to 
aiding the reform process, they simultaneously worsened efforts.   
After peace was achieved in South Africa, police reform was gradually 
negotiated, evaluated, and reformulated gradually.  In contrast to El Salvador, 
international actors proved capable of influencing reform measures.  International 
criminal experts were brought in and helped formulate the “model” of policing that took 
shape.  Community policing, the “buzzword” of international democratic policing was 
implemented, with varying levels of success.  Nevertheless, the international influence is 
apparent in the comprehensive white papers and policy papers produced through expert 
debate.  The international community was able to provide more influence b cause 
domestic political support was very high. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The unfolding police reform experiences of El Salvador and South Africa 
demonstrate the many challenges and dilemmas facing security transformation in war 
transitioning countries.  Major challenges resulting from post-conflict conditions involve 
the transitional security vacuum, surges in crime, the creation of parallel police forces, 
the difficulty in creating meaningful mechanisms of accountability, and the challenge of 
implementing simultaneous judicial reform.  Interwoven with these domestic challenges 
are the challenges of the international community in providing the much needed 
assistance to implement the reform processes.  Although international actors have 
provided overwhelming amounts of aid, the challenges in the areas of funding, and 
international competing interests have simultaneously aggravated efforts.   
The experiences of El Salvador and South Africa suggest that there are no clear-
cut methods of successfully reforming militarized police forces.  Surprisingly, although 
each country exhibited different levels of support among various actors, and different 
approaches (“shock treatment” vs gradual) the outcome of their efforts was quite similar 
– middle of the road reforms.  While both countries had internal conflicts resulting in 
militarized police forces, South Africa seemed in a much better position to face the 
challenges of consolidation.  First, South Africa’s military did not pose any opposition to 
police reform, as was the cas in El Salvador.  Second, the results of the foundational 
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elections in South Africa gave the advantage to the opposition, while in El Salvador, the 
continuance of the rightist ARENA government meant less domestic political support for 
reform.  Third, greater domestic support in South Africa meant that the international 
community had a greater ability to influence the implementation of reform.  Again, the 
outcome of reform efforts in both countries was remarkably similar.  This can best be 
explained by the overwhelming obstacle to the consolidation of police reform posed by 
the conditions of post-c nflict societies. 
Countries transitioning from authoritarian rule to democracy that have 
experienced internal conflict or civil war (war transitions) face profound transformation.  
Often centuries of colonial, racist, or military rule have left deep scars on the fabric of 
society.  Many of the challenges faced by El Salvador and South Africa are shared with 
other developing countries transitioning from conflict.  The essons learned from the 
experiences in El Salvador and South Africa can effectively contribute to the design of 
future interventions, in Southern Africa, Latin America, and in other countries and 
regions where criminal justice is in a state of post-conflict ransition.  After the 
inauguration of new democracies founded on principles of liberty and equality, nations 
can move towards becoming societies of free citizens, living in peace with itself and its 
neighbors and made up of citizens who manifest, and enjoy mutual respect for their 
fellow citizens.  However, this idealistic vision is highly dependent on the ability of the 
state, government, and citizenry to cast off the inheritances of the past.  This is true for all 
social institutions, public or private.  Above all, it demands that the institutions of 
policing and justice can come to terms with the demands of a new age. 
This transformation of new civilian policing institutions is perhaps the most 
profound and difficult.  After all, we are not talking about new and fashionable policies.  
The principles of governance, which underpinned authoritarian regimes, are often 
fundamentally so different from those of the new “disorder” that change is neither 
immediate nor easy.  The choices made today will effect the very foundation of the new 
social order.  Therefore, these choices should be made carefully, wisely, and boldly. 
Transformation of police will not occur spontaneously.  The choice of policing in 
the new regime falls within the fundamental decisions of a new democratic society.  It 
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follows that the demilitarization of civilian police forces is central to the police reform 
course that is charted.  First, and fundamentally, demilitarization must include the 
establishment of institutional boundaries betwe n the military and the civilian police 
forces.  This included changes in their structure, and establishment of civilian control, 
fundamental to good civil-mil tary relations in democratic consolidation.  Second, in 
order to change the nature and culture of cor upt police forces, professionalization must 
be given priority.  Training, both initial and continuing, in minimal use of force, and 
community policing methods will go a long way towards minimizing the resurgence of 
past human rights abuses, addressing citizen grievances, and winning the confidence of 
the communities they serve.  Third, the institutional linchpin of democratic governance, 
police forces must adopt meaningful oversight and accountability mechanisms.  Any 
democratic institution which does not have adequate accountability procedures (checks 
and balances) risks losing legitimacy, which can lead to crisis and eventual breakdown.  
This thesis has shown that war transitions afford key opportunities to reform 
corrupt and repressive internal scurity apparatuses.  However, the degree and nature of 
internal security reforms depends on the interests and balance of power of key actors 
affect by the reform.  Furthermore, the challenges that affect the consolidation of internal 
security reform in war tr nsitions are related to the overwhelming challenges related to 
post-conflict conditions.  Finally, negotiated transitions provide an opening for 
international actors to affect major police reforms.  Although international actors are 
more likely to have an opportunity to affect police reform during negotiations of peace 
treaties, their actual level of influence depends on the level of domestic support and the 
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